78 ideas
19608 | Wisdom is just the last gasp of a dying civilization [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Wisdom is the last word of an expiring civilization, the nimbus of historic twilights, fatigue transfigured into a vision of the world, the last tolerance before the advent of newer gods, and of barbarism. A vain attempt at melody among the death rattles. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Twilight') | |
A reaction: I didn't quite get what he said there, but I picked up the tone all right. But I thought wisdom was something sought in the early stages of western civilization, and now relegated to the wings as an idle dream? |
19624 | Intelligence only fully flourishes at the end of a historical period [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Intelligence flourishes only in the ages when beliefs wither. ...Every period's ending is the mind's paradise, for the mind regains its play and its whims only within an organism in utter dissolution. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Felicity') | |
A reaction: I wouldn't have thought that the facts of history supported this very well. The golden ages of philosophy are the Age of Pericles, the Aristotelian Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the early twentieth century. |
19599 | Ideas are neutral, but people fill them with passion and weakness [Cioran] |
Full Idea: In itself, every idea is neutral, or should be; but man animates ideas, projects his flames and flaws into them. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Genealogy') | |
A reaction: If it isn't neutral (if, say, it expresses love or hatred) then presumably it doesn't qualify as an 'idea'. Are ideas as neutral as mathematical theorems. It's a nice remark, and a good epigraph for a book on the history of ideas. |
19629 | A nation gives expression to its sum of values, and is then exhausted [Cioran] |
Full Idea: A nation cannot create indefinitely. It is called upon to give expression and meaning to a sum of values which are exhausted with the soul which has begotten them. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 3) | |
A reaction: This phenomenon is obvious. Is it the people who run out of steam, or the ideas and values to which their nation is giving expression? Is this a reason to break up nations every few centuries, and re-form them differently? Break up the UK! |
19631 | The history of ideas (and deeds) occurs in a meaningless environment [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The history of ideas, like that of deeds, unfolds in a meaningless climate. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 3) | |
A reaction: This is the 'Tory' view of the history of ideas (as opposed to the 'Whig' view of directedness - a distinction made by historians). I would say there are periods where a certain inevitable sequence is worked out, but then there are dislocations. |
19645 | Some thinkers would have been just as dynamic, no matter when they had lived [Cioran] |
Full Idea: A Kierkegaard, a Nietzsche, had they appeared in the most anodyne age, would have had no less tremulous, no less incendiary an inspiration. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Truths') | |
A reaction: He is saying that some (only some) thinkers are independent of the age and culture in which they live. Personally I think of those two as distinctive products of a romantic age. Diogenes of Sinope seems a bit of a misfit! |
19621 | Originality in philosophy is just the invention of terms [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The philosopher's originality comes down to inventing terms. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Farewell') | |
A reaction: Analytic philosophers are just as obsessed with inventing terms as their continental rivals. Kit Fine, for example. It can't be wrong to invent terms. Scientists do it too. |
19618 | I abandoned philosophy because it didn't acknowledge melancholy and human weakness [Cioran] |
Full Idea: I turned away from philosophy when it became impossible to discover in Kant any human weakness, any authentic accent of melancholy; in Kant and in all the philosophers. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Farewell') | |
A reaction: An interesting challenge, but if I set out to develop a philosophy based on human weakness I'm not sure where I would start, once I had settled the 'akrasia' [weakness of will] problem. |
19607 | The mind is superficial, only concerned with the arrangement of events, not their significance [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The mind in itself can be only superficial, its nature being uniquely concerned with the arrangement of conceptual events, and not with their implications in the spheres the signify. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 'The Abstract') | |
A reaction: This may be excessively pessimistic, and any decent philosopher must partially concede the point. Thoughts about the significance of historical events just recede into the mist. |
19638 | Metaphysics is a universalisation of physical anguish [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Every metaphysic begins with an anguish of the body, which then becomes universal. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Underside') | |
A reaction: Not sure if I understand this, but anyone who registers the physical aspect of abstract thought gets a nod of approval from me. |
21634 | Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics can be divided into two parts: first ontology, which is supposed to tell us what there is in general. The second part is the rest of metaphysics, which is supposed to tell us what these things are like, in various general ways. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 01.1) | |
A reaction: Hofweber is a fairly sceptical guide to metaphysics, but this has been the standard view for the last decade. Before that, Quine had set an agenda of mere ontology. |
19620 | Great systems of philosophy are just brilliant tautologies [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The great philosophical systems are no more than brilliant tautologies. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Farewell') | |
A reaction: This makes them sound pointless, but the terms used in the system all have some kind of reference, so the systems are in some way about the world, and not mere private games. At the very least, they are a wonderful branch of poetry. |
21666 | 'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The dilemma of neo-Aristotelian metaphysics is that on an ordinary reading of prioriy, 'fundamentality' won't give the intended results, and on a metaphysical reading it turns into esoteric metaphysics. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.2) | |
A reaction: Hofweber is hostile to 'esoteric' metaphysics, but sympathetic to 'egalitarian' metaphysics, which anyone can understand (with a bit of effort). |
19630 | No great idea ever emerged from a dialogue [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Nothing monumental has ever emerged from dialogue, nothing explosive, nothing 'great'. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 3) | |
A reaction: This may be an argument in favour of dialogue! It smacks of the creepier side of Nietzsche's thinking. I suspect individuals have had many great ideas during dialogues, though not as part of them. Greek schools were all dialogue. |
19636 | Truth is just an error insufficiently experienced [Cioran] |
Full Idea: What we call truth is an error insufficiently experienced. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 5) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how to go about refuting that claim! Turn the tables, I suppose. 'Tell me, Cioran, are you claiming that this idea is true?' |
19642 | Eventually every 'truth' is guaranteed by the police [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Once a belief is established the police will guarantee its 'truth' sooner or later. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Views') |
21640 | 'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: 'It's true that Fido is a dog' gives rise to a contrastive focus on 'true', with the contrast class probably depending on members like 'it's false that...' or 'it's unlikely that...'. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.6.3) | |
A reaction: If we introduce (from linguistics) the idea of a 'contrast class', then Ramsey's famous example begins to sound meaningful. It might occur in a discussion of 'did Antony actually say 'Friends, Romans. countrymen'?' |
21657 | Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Since properties themselves can have properties there is a well-known division in the theory of properties between those who take a typed and those who take a type-free approach. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.5) | |
A reaction: I take this idea to be about linguistic predicates, and about semantics which draws on model theory. To see it as about actual 'properties' in the physical world makes no sense. |
21653 | Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: A more radical alternative which takes names not to be referring even in the broader sense, but only takes speakers to refer with uses of names. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.1) | |
A reaction: Given that you can make up nicknames and silly nonce names for people, this seems plausible. I may say a name in a crowded room and three people look up. |
21636 | 'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Being a 'singular term' is not a category in contemporary syntactic theory and it doesn't correspond to any of the notions employed there like that of a singular noun phrase or the like. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.3) | |
A reaction: Hofweber has researched such things. This is an important objection to the reliance of modern Fregeans on the ontological commitments of singular terms (as proof that there are 'mathematical objects'). |
21637 | If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Identity between objects occurs in 'How Mary makes a chocolate cake is identical to how my grandfather used to make it', but does this show that 'how Mary makes a chocolate cake' aims to pick out an entity? | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.3) | |
A reaction: This is a counterexample to the Fregean thought that the criterion for the existence of the referent of a singular term is its capacity to participate in an identity relation. Defenders of the Fregean view are aware of such examples. |
21643 | The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: When we ask 'is there a number?' in its inferential role (or internalist) reading, then we ask whether or not there is a true instance of 't is a number'. When we ask in its domain conditions (externalist) reading, we ask if the world contains a number. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 03.6) | |
A reaction: Hofweber's key distinction. The distinction between making truth prior and making reference prior is intriguing and important. The internalist version is close to substitutional quantification. Only the externalist view needs robust reference. |
19632 | An axiom has no more authority than a frenzy [Cioran] |
Full Idea: This earth is a place where can confirm anything with an equal likelihood: here axioms and frenzies are interchangeable. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 3) | |
A reaction: A perceptive and poetic expression of the modern anti-Euclidean and anti-Fregean view of axioms, as purely formal features of a model or system. |
21644 | Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Number words have a singular term use, and adjectival (or determiner) use, and the symbolic use. The main question is how they relate to each other. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 05.1) | |
A reaction: Thus 'the number four is even', 'there are four moons', and '4 comes after 3'. |
21646 | The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The now famous Piraha language, of the Amazon region in Brazil, allegedly has no number words. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 05.6) | |
A reaction: Two groups can be shown to be of equal cardinality, by one-to-one matching rather than by counting. They could get by using 'equals' (and maybe unequally bigger and unequally smaller), and intuitive feelings for sizes of groups. |
21665 | The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The prime numbers are more fundamental than the even numbers, and than the composite non-prime numbers. The result that all numbers uniquely decompose into a product of prime numbers is called the 'Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic'. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.2) | |
A reaction: I could have used this example in my thesis, which defended the view that essences are the fundamentals of explanation, even in abstract theoretical realms. |
21649 | How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Number words as singular terms seem to refer to objects; numbers words in determiner or adjectival position are tied to counting. How these objects are related to counting is what the application problem is about. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 06.1.3) | |
A reaction: You can't use stones for counting, so there must be more to numbers than the announcement that they are 'objects'. They seem to have internal relations, which makes them unusual objects. |
21647 | Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Frege's tying the objectivity of arithmetic to the objectivity of logic makes sense of the fact that can find out about arithmetic by thinking alone. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 06.1.1) | |
A reaction: This assumes that logic is entirely a priori. We might compare the geometry of land surfaces with 'pure' geometry. If numbers are independent objects, it is unclear how we could have any a priori knowledge of them. |
21648 | Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: A major flaw of the neo-Fregean program is that it is more impressed by the technical result that Peano Arithmetic can be interpreted by second-order logic plus Hume's Principle, than empirical considerations about how numbers come about. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 06.1.3) | |
A reaction: This doesn't sound like a problem that would bother Fregeans or neo-Fregeans much. Deriving the Peano Axioms from various beginnings has become a parlour game for modern philosophers of mathematics. |
21664 | Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The results from the use of supervenience in philosophical theorising are limited. In particular, modal notions can't distinguish between things which necessarily go together. For example, that truths about numbers are grounded in truths about sets. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
21660 | Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Reality can be seen as everything that is the case - the totality of all facts that obtain - or reality can be seen as everything there is - the totality of all things that exist. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 10) | |
A reaction: Things are a lot easier to specify than facts, but on the whole I prefer facts, just in order to affirm that there is more to reality than the mere 'things' that compose it. Our ontology must capture the dynamic and relational character of reality. |
21661 | There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: We do have reason to think that there are ineffable facts, and that these facts are systematically hidden from us. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 10.2.4) | |
A reaction: [Hofweber's Ch.10 is a lengthy and interesting discussion of ineffable facts] Things which are very very small, or very very remote in space seem obvious candidates. The most obvious candidates are tiny detail about the remote past. |
21652 | Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The belief that there are simples arranged chair-wise is not a perceptual belief. Our perceptual beliefs have a content about ordinary objects, not simples arranged chair-wise. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 07.3.1) | |
A reaction: Hofweber gives ontological priority to 'perceptual beliefs'. I'm inclined to agree, but I hear the critical hordes swarming against the gate. |
21663 | Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Counterfactuals are important for reasoning about the past and to plan for the future. If we want to learn from our mistakes, it is important to think about what would have happened if I had done things differently. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.1) | |
A reaction: A thought also found in Tim Williamson, but not the sort of thing you hear from Lewis or Stalnaker. It is a nice example of how highly abstract and theoretical problems need to be slotted into human psychology. |
19626 | Our instincts had to be blunted and diminished, to make way for consciousness! [Cioran] |
Full Idea: How much our instincts must have had to be blunted and their functioning slackened before consciousness extended its control over the sum of our actions and our thoughts! | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Coming') | |
A reaction: Modern wisdom, founded in neuroscience, seems to tell us that the role of consciousness even now is far less than Cioran believed. Once you digest that wisdom, I believe introspection supports it. Still, instinct in animals is much stronger than ours. |
19633 | We use concepts to master our fears; saying 'death' releases us from confronting it [Cioran] |
Full Idea: It is the use of concepts which makes us master of our fears. We say: Death - and this abstraction releases us from experiencing its infinity, its horror. By baptising events and things, we elude the inexplicable. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 3) | |
A reaction: I like this idea. I'm struck by how weird our lives would become if people no longer had names. They are so deeply embedded in our experience that we don't notice them. Imagine if it were taboo to ever name death. |
21654 | The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The picture of language often called the "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in natural languages refers; they simply differ in what they refer to. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.2) | |
A reaction: It seems obvious that at least there are syncategorematic terms like 'not' and 'or' and 'maybe' that are internal to language. I'm inclining to the opposite view of Paul Pietroski. Hofweber says if all words are names, they can't add up to truth. |
21641 | Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: An inferential role semantics is generally seen as a large-scale alternative to a semantics based on reference and other language-world relations. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 03.4.5) | |
A reaction: Presumably the other obvious language-world relation is truth. Being a robust realist, I take it I have to be strongly committed to semantics which connects to the world - or do I? Reality is robust, but our talk about it is evasive? |
21638 | Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Syntactic form is not only related to the truth conditions of a sentence; it is also related to what focus an utterance of a sentence will have. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.5.2) | |
A reaction: Hofweber has commendably studied some linguistics. The idea of mental and linguistic 'focus' increasingly strikes me as of importance in many areas of philosophy. E.g. in the scope of ethics, on whom should you focus? |
21658 | Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Simply because there is no single word in a certain language for a certain property doesn't mean that it isn't expressible in that language. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 09.1.1) | |
A reaction: Good. For example a shade of blue for which there is no label might be 'the next darkest discriminable shade of blue adjacent to the one we are looking at'. And then the one after that... But 'tastes better than Diet Pepsi' in ancient Greek? |
21659 | 'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: It is said that not every property can be expressed because there are more properties than there are predicates. ...But the same predicate can be used to express many different properties: 'being taller than this' depends on what 'this' refers to. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 09.2) | |
A reaction: A good example, but being a comparative and relying on a demonstrative indexical makes it a favourable example. 'Being made of iron' doesn't have much scope for expressing many properties. |
21655 | Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Compositional semantics assigns semantic values to various expressions in order to generate the truth conditions of the sentences in which they can occur correctly, ...thus leading to the truth-conditions of the sentence. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.3) | |
A reaction: I favour both the compositional and the truth-conditional accounts of semantics, but I am not sure how to fit the pragmatic and contextual ingredient into that picture. You can't leave out psychology. |
21656 | Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: If there propositions then they do not have content, because they are content. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.4) | |
A reaction: This sounds right. A rather obvious regress threatens if you say otherwise. |
21635 | Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: If there are no propositions, then there are no contents, and thus there are no beliefs and desires. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 01.4.3) | |
A reaction: A simple but powerful point. Those who claim that there are only sentences (and no propositions) can hardly claim that you must formulate a sentence every time you have a specific belief or desire. |
21662 | Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Might there be some thought token that has a different content than any such token we can in principle have? | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 10.3.3) | |
A reaction: For me the idea that a thought might exist which can never be thought is an absurdity, but people who believe in the external existence of parts of reality called 'propositions' seem committed to it. A baffling view. |
21645 | 'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: 'Semantic type coercion' is where an expression of variable type is forced to take a particular type on a particular occasion so that the sentence as a whole in which it occurse is semantically interpretable. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 05.4.4) | |
A reaction: He compares 'and' in 'John sang and Mary danced' with 'John and Mary danced together', where 'and' can vary in type, and we adopt the reading that makes sense. Hofweber says we do this with number language. He favours 'cognitive need'. |
21639 | 'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: 'Background deletion' is the pheomenon that what isn't focused in an answer, what is the background, can be left out of the answer, with the resulting sub-sentential answer nonetheless being appropriate. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.6.2) | |
A reaction: [I'm struck by the verbosity of this sentence, from an over-long book] It is not unreasonable to think that each conversational exchange has an implicit and agreed domain of quantification. Well, 'focus', then. |
19615 | I want to suppress in myself the normal reasons people have for action [Cioran] |
Full Idea: I want to suppress in myself the reasons men invoke in order to exist, in order to act. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Gamut') | |
A reaction: So much of our inner and moral life concerns not what we think or feel, but what we want to think or feel. The theory of action (if there can be such a thing) must account for these metareasons, which hover over us while we act. |
19628 | At a civilisation's peak values are all that matters, and people unconsciously live by them [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Epochs of apogee cultivate values for their own sake: life is only a means of realising them; the individual is not aware of living - he lives. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 3) | |
A reaction: This is a very Nietzschean thought. Mind you, a crazed and dangerous crowd exhibits the same absorption in simple values. |
22086 | The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
Full Idea: Kierkegaard insisted that the most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion. | |
From: report of Søren Kierkegaard (works [1845]) by Clare Carlisle - Kierkegaard: a guide for the perplexed Intro | |
A reaction: Hume comes to mind for a similar view, but in character Hume was far more rational than Kierkegaard. |
19646 | Values don't accumulate; they are ruthlessly replaced [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Values do not accumulate: a generation contributes something new only by trampling on what was unique in the preceding generation. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'We') | |
A reaction: That may seem true for a Frenchman or a Romanian, but it doesn't feel true of British culture, which seems to me to have accumulated values over the last five hundred years. Before 1500 it seems to me to be a foreign country. We may be near the end! |
19614 | Lovers are hateful, apart from their hovering awareness of death [Cioran] |
Full Idea: As for lovers, they would be hateful if among their grimaces the presentiment of death did not hover. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Gamut') | |
A reaction: A nice existential corrective, if you were planning to build an ethical system around a rather sentimental idea of love! If you are not gripped by a latent fear that your beloved may die, I doubt whether you are in love. |
19634 | Man is never himself; he always aims at less than life, or more than life [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Able to live only beyond and short of life, man is a prey to two temptation: imbecility and sanctity: sub-man and superman, never himself. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 4 'Threat') | |
A reaction: To me, Taoism embodies imbecility, and spiritual religions embody the superman idea. [This is not Nietzsche's übermensch]. |
19619 | To live authentically, we must see that philosophy is totally useless [Cioran] |
Full Idea: We begin to live authentically only where philosophy ends, at its wreck, when we have understood its terrible nullity, when we have understood that it was futile to resort to it, that it is no help. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Farewell') | |
A reaction: The existentialist dream of trying to find an 'authentic' way of life. That idea means nothing to me. You would need to be utterly immersed in the life of a community with which you identified to live authentically, and that life has almost vanished. |
19617 | Evidence suggests that humans do not have a purpose [Cioran] |
Full Idea: By all evidence, we are in the world to do nothing. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Militant') | |
A reaction: I'm not clear what evidence there could be. Other animals are all enmeshed in a particular environment. As soon as homo sapiens left Africa, it became a baffling phenonomen. I'm not sure what an alligator is in the world for, either. |
19612 | The universe is dirty and fragile, as if a scandal in nothingness had produced its matter [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Everything which is done and undone in the universe bears the stamp of a filthy fragility, as if matter were the fruit of a scandal at the core of nothingness. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Reactionary') | |
A reaction: A gloriously imagined idea, worthy of Shakespeare. By 'scandal' I suppose he implies that the universe is the bastard child of a horrible relationship. A prize exhibit for my 'Nihilism' collection. True nihilists, of course, don't write books. |
19622 | The pointlessness of our motives and irrelevance of our gestures reveals our vacuity [Cioran] |
Full Idea: When we realise that no human motive is compatible with infinity, and that no gesture is worth the trouble of making it, our heart, by its very beating, can no longer conceal its vacuity. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Disintoxication') | |
A reaction: An interesting choice of reasons. Nihilism in comparison with infinity, and in comparison with the vastness of society? If you were immortal, and there were only fifty other humans, would that help? |
19606 | We can only live because our imagination and memory are poor [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Life is possible only by the deficiencies of our imagination and our memory | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Key') | |
A reaction: Does this mean that we should actually aspire to limit our imaginations and memories? Or are we mercifully intrinsically limited, so that massive intellectual ambition will do no harm? We should be told these things, Cioran! |
19604 | Unlike other creatures, mankind seems lost in nature [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Whereas all beings have their place in nature, man remains a metaphysically straying creature, lost in Life, a stranger to the Creation. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Indirect5') | |
A reaction: Nice challenge to the Aristotelian idea that we can identify the nature and function of man, and derive an ethics from it. This idea seems to state the essence of existentialism, perhaps better than anything in Sartre. We should have stayed in Africa? |
19601 | Life is now more dreaded than death [Cioran] |
Full Idea: By dint of accumulating non-mysteries and monopolizing non-meanings, life inspires more dread than death; it is life which is the Great Unknown. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Variations') | |
A reaction: This is the sort of remark we pay continental philosophers to make. |
19641 | If you lack beliefs, boredom is your martyrdom [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Ennui is the martyrdom of those who live and die for no belief. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Obsequies') |
19644 | History is the bloody rejection of boredom [Cioran] |
Full Idea: History is the bloody product of the rejection of boredom. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Views') | |
A reaction: How many absurd and horrible things have been done by people who could not stand being bored? But also, almost everything wonderful has the same source. How did Bach and Shakespeare and Rembrandt feel about boredom? |
19640 | No one is brave enough to say they don't want to do anything; we despise such a view [Cioran] |
Full Idea: No one has the audacity to exclaim: 'I don't want to do anything!' - we are more indulgent with a murderer than with a mind emancipated from actions. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'The Architect') | |
A reaction: Perhaps this should be the anti-epigraph for this website. I've slogged away at this project for nineteen years, probably for no other reason than that inactivity appears to be wicked. If I abandoned it, I would invent another project. Sad. |
19602 | You are stuck in the past if you don't know boredom [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The man who knows nothing of ennui is still in the world's childhood. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Dislocation') | |
A reaction: Boredom well may be the central experience of existentialism, rather than angst, or nihilism, or the temptations of suicide. |
19613 | It is pointless to refuse or accept the social order; we must endure it like the weather [Cioran] |
Full Idea: It is equally futile to refuse or to accept the social order: we must endure its changes for the better or the worse with a despairing conformism, as we endure birth, love, the weather, and death. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Reactionary') |
19627 | Opportunists can save a nation, and heroes can ruin it [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Opportunists have saved nations; heroes have ruined them. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Defense') | |
A reaction: Siegfried smashes the staff of Wotan. Napoleon looks like a hero, but he increasingly looks like the single most disastrous figure ever to have emerged in Europe. It took the Germans till 1940 to avenge what he did. |
19625 | The ideal is to impose a religion by force, and then live in doubt about its beliefs [Cioran] |
Full Idea: To belong to a church uncertain of its god - after once imposing that god by fire and sword - should be the ideal of every detached mind. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Felicity') | |
A reaction: I'm trying hard to think of an adequate response to this. I'll get back to you.... |
19605 | Despite endless suggestions, no one has found a goal for history [Cioran] |
Full Idea: No one has found a valid goal for history; but everyone has proposed one. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Indirect') | |
A reaction: This seems to be an attack on the Hegelian idea of destiny that suffused both marxism and fascism in the 1930s. |
19637 | History is wonderfully devoid of meaning [Cioran] |
Full Idea: That History has no meaning is what should delight our hearts. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 5) | |
A reaction: I have just read a history of the Wars of the Roses, and I wholeheartedly endorse Cioran's view. |
19611 | No one has ever found a good argument against suicide [Cioran] |
Full Idea: No church, no civil institution has as yet invented a single argument valid against suicide. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Resources') | |
A reaction: Suicide in young people usually looks like an error of judgement (in quiet moments of history). You need more inductive evidence that life is going to be irremediably awful. But if life is fine but they choose suicide anyway, what can you say? |
19610 | Religions see suicide as insubordination [Cioran] |
Full Idea: If the religions have forbidden us to die by our own hand, it is because they saw that such practices set an example of insubordination which humiliated temples and gods alike. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Resources') | |
A reaction: Has anyone ever committed suicide in a cathedral (even during a service)? How many bishops, cardinals, rabbis etc have committed suicide? It is not uncommon among priests in the lower echelons. |
19609 | If you have not contemplated suicide, you are a miserable worm [Cioran] |
Full Idea: The man who has never imagined his own annihilation, who has not anticipated recourse to the rope, the bullet, poison, or the sea, is a degraded galley slave or a worm crawling upon the cosmic carrion. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1'Resources') | |
A reaction: I guess by this date everyone in Paris had read Camus' 'The Myth of Sisyphus', so suicide was the main topic in the cafés. I sort of agree with it. The possibility of suicide is part of the examined life. |
19639 | We all need sexual secrets! [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Woe to those who have no sexual secrets! | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Wonders') |
19603 | Why is God so boring, and why does God resemble humanity so little? [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Why is God so dull, so feeble, so inadequately picturesque? Why does He lack interest, vigor, actuality and resemble us so little? Is there any image less anthropomorphic and more gratuitously remote? | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'The Devil') | |
A reaction: This seems to be directed at those like Feuerbach who said that we had merely created God as a glorified image of humanity. |
19616 | As the perfect wisdom of detachment, philosophy offers no rivals to Taoism [Cioran] |
Full Idea: China alone long since arrived at a refined wisdom superior to philosophy: Taoism surpasses all the mind has conceived by way of detachment. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Militant') | |
A reaction: Personally I dislike Taoism, which seems to advocate a sort of suicide within life. But given Cioran's evident state of mind, I can see its attractions. If this country deteriorates any further [I write on 4th July 2016], I may turn to Taoism. |
19600 | When man abandons religion, he then follows new fake gods and mythologies [Cioran] |
Full Idea: Even when he turns from religion, man remains subject to it; depleting himself to create fake gods, he then feverishly adopts them: his need for fiction, for mythology triumphs over evidence and absurdity alike. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 1 'Genealogy') | |
A reaction: Cioran had just lived through the high water mark of communism and fascism. I don't think modern atheists fit this description very well. |
19643 | A religion needs to motivate killings, and cannot tolerate rivals [Cioran] |
Full Idea: A religion dies when it tolerates truths which exclude it; and the god in whose name one no longer kills is dead indeed. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], 6 'Views') | |
A reaction: I fear that in our time we have people who are killing in the name of their religion as a last resort to try to convince themselves that their religion is not dying. It is startlingly how religion can now be publicly mocked. Unthinkable 50 years ago. |
19623 | Circles of hell are ridiculous; all that matters is to be there [Cioran] |
Full Idea: What a preposterous notion, to draw circles in hell, to make the intensity of the flames vary in its compartments, to hierarchise its torments! The important thing is to be there. | |
From: E.M. Cioran (A Short History of Decay [1949], '1 'La Perduta') |