5 ideas
| 16007 | I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard] |
| Full Idea: I always reason from existence, not towards existence. | |
| From: Søren Kierkegaard (Philosophical Fragments [1844], p.40) | |
| A reaction: Kierkegaard's important premise to help show that theistic proofs for God's existence don't actually prove existence, but develop the content of a conception. [SY] |
| 16013 | Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard] |
| Full Idea: Can the necessary come into existence? That is a change, and everything that comes into existence demonstrates that it is not necessary. The necessary already 'is'. | |
| From: Søren Kierkegaard (Philosophical Fragments [1844], p.74) | |
| A reaction: [SY] |
| 8044 | Goffman sees the self as no more than a peg on which to hang roles we play [Goffman, by MacIntyre] |
| Full Idea: Erving Goffman has liquidated the self into its role-playing, arguing that the self is no more than 'a peg' on which the clothes of the role are hung. | |
| From: report of Erving Goffman (Presentation of Self in Everyday Life [1959]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: A rather unsympathetic expression of his view, but it seems to be a widely held view among students of sociology. But then sociologists are almost committed a priori to a social and relativist view of truth, persons, knowledge, religion etc. |
| 3161 | If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey on Dennett] |
| Full Idea: If something has beliefs only if something else is disposed to "treat it" (i.e. think of it) as though it does, then we seem at least to have an infinite regress of appeals to believers. | |
| From: comment on Daniel C. Dennett (works [1985]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 3.2.1 | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a serious difficulty for behaviourists, but is not insurmountable. We need a community of interlocking behaviours, with a particular pattern of behaviour being labelled (for instrumental convenience) as 'beliefs'. |
| 3177 | You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology [Dennett] |
| Full Idea: Folk psychology is indispensable for driving a car, which would be terrifying if we didn't assume there were psychologically normal people behind the wheels. | |
| From: Daniel C. Dennett (works [1985]), quoted by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind p.133 n35 | |
| A reaction: Nice example. If someone is approaching you from the front on your side of the road, should you assume that they are 'psychologically normal'? Does psychology imply behaviour, or vice versa? |