Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Fragments', 'On the Essence of Human Freedom' and 'Papers of 1918'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: I always reason from existence, not towards existence.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (Philosophical Fragments [1844], p.40)
     A reaction: Kierkegaard's important premise to help show that theistic proofs for God's existence don't actually prove existence, but develop the content of a conception. [SY]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: Can the necessary come into existence? That is a change, and everything that comes into existence demonstrates that it is not necessary. The necessary already 'is'.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (Philosophical Fragments [1844], p.74)
     A reaction: [SY]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact [Russell]
     Full Idea: It is perfectly evident that a proposition is not the name for a fact, from the mere circumstance that there are two propositions corresponding to each fact. 'Socrates is dead' and 'Socrates is not dead' correspond to the same fact.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Papers of 1918 [1918], VIII.136), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 42 'Prop'
     A reaction: He finally reaches in 1918 what now looks fairly obvious. The idea that a proposition is part of the world is absurd. We should call the parts of the world 'facts' (despite vagueness and linguistic dependence in such things). Propositions are thoughts.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
Ultimately, all being is willing. The nature of primal being is the same as the nature of willing [Schelling]
     Full Idea: In the last and highest instance there is no other being but willing. Willing is primal being, and all the predicates of primal being only fit willing: groundlessness, eternity, being independent of time, self-affirmation.
     From: Friedrich Schelling (On the Essence of Human Freedom [1809], I.7.350), quoted by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 5 'Reason'
     A reaction: Insofar as this says that 'primal being' must be active in character, I love this idea. Not the rest of the idea though! Bowie says this essay clearly influenced Schopenhauer. It looks as if Nietzsche must be read it too.