10 ideas
13163 | Circles must be bounded, so cannot be infinite [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: An infinite circle is impossible, since any circle is bounded by its circumference. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Dialogue on human freedom and origin of evil [1695], p.114) | |
A reaction: This is interesting if one is asking what the essence of a circle must be. If is tempting to say merely that the radii must be equal, but can they have the length of some vast transfinite number? The circumference must be 2π bigger. |
16007 | I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: I always reason from existence, not towards existence. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Philosophical Fragments [1844], p.40) | |
A reaction: Kierkegaard's important premise to help show that theistic proofs for God's existence don't actually prove existence, but develop the content of a conception. [SY] |
16657 | Substance, Quantity and Quality are real; other categories depend on those three [Henry of Ghent] |
Full Idea: Among creatures there are only three 'res' belong to the three first categories: Substance, Quantity and Quality. All other are aspects [rationes] and intellectual concepts with respect to them, with reality only as grounded on the res of those three. | |
From: Henry of Ghent (Quodlibeta [1284], VII:1-2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.3 | |
A reaction: Pasnau connects with the 'arrangement of being', giving an 'ontologically innocent' structure to reality. That seems to be what we all want, if only we could work out the ontologically guilty bit. |
16658 | The only reality in the category of Relation is things from another category [Henry of Ghent] |
Full Idea: There is beyond a doubt nothing real in the category of Relation, except what is a thing from another category. | |
From: Henry of Ghent (Quodlibeta [1284], VII:1-2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.3 | |
A reaction: This seems to have been the fairly orthodox scholastic view of relations. |
16645 | Accidents are diminished beings, because they are dispositions of substance (unqualified being) [Henry of Ghent] |
Full Idea: Accidents are beings only in a qualified and diminished sense, because they are not called beings, nor are they beings, except because they are dispositions of an unqualified being, a substance. | |
From: Henry of Ghent (Quodlibeta [1284], XV.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 10.4 | |
A reaction: This is aimed to 'half' detach the accidents (as the Eucharist requires). Later scholastics detached them completely. Late scholastics seem to have drifted back to Henry's view. The equivocal use of 'being' here was challenged later. |
16013 | Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: Can the necessary come into existence? That is a change, and everything that comes into existence demonstrates that it is not necessary. The necessary already 'is'. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Philosophical Fragments [1844], p.74) | |
A reaction: [SY] |
22012 | Kant says things-in-themselves cause sensations, but then makes causation transcendental! [Henry of Ghent, by Pinkard] |
Full Idea: Kant claimed that things-in-themselves caused our sensations; but causality was a transcendental condition of experience, not a property of things-in-themselves, so the great Kant had contradicted himself. | |
From: report of Henry of Ghent (Quodlibeta [1284], Supplement) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 04 | |
A reaction: This early objection by the conservative Jacobi (who disliked Enlightenment rational religion) is the key to the dispute over whether Kant is an idealist. Kant denied being an idealist, but how can he be, if this idea is correct? |
13162 | Sloth's Syllogism: either it can't happen, or it is inevitable without my effort [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The ancient Sloth's Syllogism says that if something is foreseen and infallible, it will happen without my effort, and if it is not foreseen, it will not happen, even though I am able to do it. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Dialogue on human freedom and origin of evil [1695], p.113) | |
A reaction: Presumable the foreseeing is to be done by the oracle, and not by the slothful person. |
19339 | Evil is a negation of good, which arises from non-being [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The cause of good is positive, but evil is a defect, that is, a privation or negation, and consequently, it arises from nothingness or nonbeing. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Dialogue on human freedom and origin of evil [1695], p.114) | |
A reaction: He goes on to illustrate his idea from mathematics. He is modifying Augustine's view that evil is an absence of good, by adding nonbeing as the driving force behind it. Doesn't sound very persuasive to me. |
13164 | God only made sin possible because a much greater good can be derived from it [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We must believe that God would not have allowed sin nor would he have created things he knows will sin, if he could not derive from them a good incomparably greater than the resulting evil. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Dialogue on human freedom and origin of evil [1695], p.115) | |
A reaction: Why 'must' we believe this? Do we have to imagine all the genocides shrinking to insignificance once we grasp the wonderful goods that can be derived from them? The end justifies the means. Genocide is actually a good thing. Hm. |