Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Fragments', 'Two Concepts of Liberty' and 'Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae'

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5 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence

16007	I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard]
	Full Idea: I always reason from existence, not towards existence.
	From: Søren Kierkegaard (Philosophical Fragments [1844], p.40)
	A reaction: Kierkegaard's important premise to help show that theistic proofs for God's existence don't actually prove existence, but develop the content of a conception. [SY]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

12712	Substance is that which can act [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: I define substance as that which can act.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae [1678], A6.4.1398), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
	A reaction: This is in tune with the notion that to exist is to have causal powers. I find the view congenial, and the middle period of Leibniz's thought, before monads became too spiritual, chimes in with my view.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity

16013	Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard]
	Full Idea: Can the necessary come into existence? That is a change, and everything that comes into existence demonstrates that it is not necessary. The necessary already 'is'.
	From: Søren Kierkegaard (Philosophical Fragments [1844], p.74)
	A reaction: [SY]

14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation

12737	Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: All the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by final causes, exactly as if there were no efficient causes; and all the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by efficient causes, as if there were no final causes.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae [1678], A6.4.1403), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
	A reaction: Somewhat speculative (a virtue!), but it is interesting to see him suggesting that there might be two complete and satisfactory explanations, which never touched one another. I can't see Aristotle agreeing with that.

25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle

20544	Berlin distinguishes 'negative' and 'positive' liberty, and rejects the latter [Berlin, by Swift]
	Full Idea: Isaiah Berlin draws a famous distinction between 'negative' and 'positive' concepts of liberty, and argues that the latter should be seen as a wrong turning (because totalitarian regimes have invoked it).
	From: report of Isaiah Berlin (Two Concepts of Liberty [1958]) by Adam Swift - Political Philosophy (3rd ed) 2 'Intro'
	A reaction: Swift argues against him, saying that positive liberty is not a single concept (it's three), and has aspects that should be defended. I think I'm with Swift on that. Is religious freedom a freedom 'from' something, or a freedom 'to do' something?