Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Works of Love', 'De rebus naturalibus' and 'Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism'

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6 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
A power is not a cause, but an aptitude for a cause [Zabarella]
     Full Idea: A power is not the cause of an operation, but only the cause's aptitude for operating.
     From: Jacob Zabarella (De rebus naturalibus [1590], De fac anim 4:col 692), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.5
     A reaction: His example is the power of running, which is actually caused by the soul (or whatever), which generates the power. A power is a very superficial thing.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
The meaning of 'know' does not change from courtroom to living room [Unger]
     Full Idea: There is no reason to suppose that the meaning of 'know' changes from the courtroom to the living room and back again; no more than for supposing that 'vacuum' changes from the laboratory to the cannery.
     From: Peter Unger (Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism [1975], 2.1)
     A reaction: I disagree. Lots of words change their meaning (or reference) according to context. Flat, fast, tall, clever. She 'knows a lot' certainly requires a context. The bar of justification goes up and down, and 'knowledge' changes accordingly.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
No one knows anything, and no one is ever justified or reasonable [Unger]
     Full Idea: I argue for the thesis that no one ever knows about anything, ...and that consequently no one is ever justified or at all reasonable in anything.
     From: Peter Unger (Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism [1975], Intro)
     A reaction: The premiss of his book seems to be that knowledge is assumed to require certainty, and is therefore impossible. Unger has helped push us to a more relaxed and fallibilist attitude to knowledge. 'No one is reasonable' is daft!
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism
An evil scientist may give you a momentary life, with totally false memories [Unger]
     Full Idea: The evil scientist might not only be deceiving you with his electrodes; maybe he has just created you with your ostensible memory beliefs and experiences, and for good measure he will immediately destroy you, so in the next moment you no longer exist.
     From: Peter Unger (Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism [1975], 1.12)
     A reaction: This is based on Russell's scepticism about memory (Idea 2792). Even this very train of thought may not exist, if the first half of it was implanted, rather than being developed by you. I cannot see how to dispute this possibility.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: To love another in spite of his weaknesses and errors and imperfections is not perfect love. No, to love is to find him lovable in spite of, and together with, his weaknesses and errors and imperfections.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (Works of Love [1847], p.158)
     A reaction: A true romantic at heart, Kierkegaard ideally posits perfect love as unconditional love, and not just of good attributes, predicates and conditions. However, the real question for both me and Kierkegaard is, is perfect love desirable or even possible?[SY]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter is exceptionally obscure [Zabarella]
     Full Idea: Nothing in the natural world seems to be more obscure and difficult to grasp than the prime matter of things.
     From: Jacob Zabarella (De rebus naturalibus [1590], I.1 col 133), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 2.1
     A reaction: This spells the beginning of the end for 'prime matter', since a late scholastic is doubting it, even before the scientists got to work. Most modern Aristotelians slide quietly past prime matter, as unhelpful.