Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'No Moral Difference' and 'Locke on Essences and Kinds'

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7 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle]
     Full Idea: It is clear the nominal essences really are the properties of the things which have them: they are (a subset of) the observable properties of the things.
     From: Antony Eagle (Locke on Essences and Kinds [2005], IV)
     A reaction: I think this is wrong. The surface characteristics are all that is available to us, so our classifications must be based on those, but it is on the ideas of them, not their intrinsic natures. That is empiricsm! What makes the properties 'essential'?
If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle]
     Full Idea: If the kinds there are depend not on the essences of the objects but on their observed distinguishing particulars, ...then for any kind that we think there is, it is possible that there are many underlying essences which are observably indistinguishable.
     From: Antony Eagle (Locke on Essences and Kinds [2005], IV)
     A reaction: Eagle is commenting on Locke's reliance on nominal essences. This seems to be the genuine problem with jadeite and nephrite (both taken to be 'jade'), or with 'fool's gold'. This isn't an objection to Locke; it just explains the role of science.
Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle]
     Full Idea: Nominal essence does not allow for gradations in significance for the underlying properties. Those are all essential for the object behaving as it observably does, and they must all be given equal weight when deciding what the object does.
     From: Antony Eagle (Locke on Essences and Kinds [2005], IV)
     A reaction: This is where 'scientific' essentialism comes in. If we take one object, or one kind of object, in isolation, Eagle is right. When we start to compare, and to set up controlled conditions tests, we can dig into the 'gradations' he cares about.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
     Full Idea: Kierkegaard insisted that the most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion.
     From: report of Søren Kierkegaard (works [1845]) by Clare Carlisle - Kierkegaard: a guide for the perplexed Intro
     A reaction: Hume comes to mind for a similar view, but in character Hume was far more rational than Kierkegaard.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 2. Euthanasia
It has become normal to consider passive euthanasia while condemning active euthanasia [Rachels]
     Full Idea: It seems to have become accepted that passive euthanasia (by withholding treatment and allowing a patient to die) may be acceptable, whereas active euthanasia (direct action to kill the patient) is never acceptable.
     From: James Rachels (No Moral Difference [1975], p.97)
     A reaction: He goes on to attack the distinction. It is hard to distinguish the two cases, as well as being hard to judge them.
If it is desirable that a given patient die, then moral objections to killing them do not apply [Rachels]
     Full Idea: The cause of death (injection or disease) is important from the legal point of view, but not morally. If euthanasia is desirable in a given case then the patient's death is not an evil, so the usual objections to killing do not apply.
     From: James Rachels (No Moral Difference [1975], p.102)
     A reaction: Seems reasonable, but a very consequentialist view. Is it good that small children should clean public toilets?
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle]
     Full Idea: The natural thought is to think that real kinds are given only by classification on the basis of essential properties: properties that make an object the kind of thing that it is.
     From: Antony Eagle (Locke on Essences and Kinds [2005], II)
     A reaction: Circularity alert! Circularity alert! Essence gives a thing its kind - and hence we can see what the kind is? Test for a trivial property! Eagle is not unaware of these issues. Does he mean 'necessary' rather than 'essential'?