21970
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Philosophy attains its goal if one person feels perfect accord between their system and experience [Fichte]
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Full Idea:
If even a single person is completely convinced of his philosophy; ...if his free judgement in philosophising, and what life obtrudes upon him, are perfectly in accord; then in this person philosophy has completed its circuit and attained its goal.
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From:
Johann Fichte (works [1798], I:512), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 06.4
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A reaction:
Interesting to hear a famous idealist offering accordance with real life as a criterion for philosophical success. But that is real life, but not as you and I may know it.... His criterion is very subjective. A bad philosopher might attain it?
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21964
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Reason arises from freedom, so philosophy starts from the self, and not from the laws of nature [Fichte]
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Full Idea:
Not by any law of nature do we attain to reason; we achieve it by absolute freedom. ...In philosophy, therefore, we must necessarily start from the self. The materialists' project of deriving the appearance of reason from natural laws is impossible.
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From:
Johann Fichte (works [1798], I:298), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics
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A reaction:
I blame Descartes' Cogito for this misunderstanding. The underlying idea (in Kant, and probably earlier) is that pure reason needs pure free will. Modern thought usually sees reason as extremely impure.
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21968
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Abandon the thing-in-itself; things only exist in relation to our thinking [Fichte]
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Full Idea:
We must be rid of the thing-in-itself; for whatever we may think, we are that which thinks therein, and hence nothing could ever come to exist independently of us, for everything is necessarily related to our thinking.
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From:
Johann Fichte (works [1798], I:501), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 06.3
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A reaction:
Some statements of idealism are understandable, or even quite plausible, but this one sounds ridiculous. The idea that if human beings die out then reality ceases to exist is absurd humanistic vanity.
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21965
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Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte]
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Full Idea:
Spinoza could only think his philosophy, not believe it, for it stood in immediate contradiction to his necessary conviction in daily life, whereby he was bound to regard himself as free and independent.
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From:
Johann Fichte (works [1798], I:513), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 06.2
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A reaction:
This seems to be invoking Kant's idea that we must presuppose free will, rather than an assertion that we actually have it.
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15998
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Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard]
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Full Idea:
To love another in spite of his weaknesses and errors and imperfections is not perfect love. No, to love is to find him lovable in spite of, and together with, his weaknesses and errors and imperfections.
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From:
Søren Kierkegaard (Works of Love [1847], p.158)
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A reaction:
A true romantic at heart, Kierkegaard ideally posits perfect love as unconditional love, and not just of good attributes, predicates and conditions. However, the real question for both me and Kierkegaard is, is perfect love desirable or even possible?[SY]
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18202
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The concept of a field gradually replaced the substances in explaining relations between charges [Einstein/Infeld]
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Full Idea:
In the beginning the field concept was no more than a means of facilitating the understanding of phenomena. ...In the new field language it is the field and not the charges themselves which is essential. The substance was overshadowed by the field.
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From:
Einstein,A/Infeld,L (The Evolution of Physics [1938], p.151), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics II.4
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A reaction:
This is very important for philosophical metaphysicians, especially those like me who want to explain the universe by the nature of the stuff that composes it. The 'stuff' had better not be simplistic individual 'substances'.
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