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All the ideas for 'works', 'works' and 'Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed)'

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9 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention

12394	If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman]
	Full Idea: A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend.
	From: Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954], p.64)
	A reaction: This is clearly in tune with Quine's assertion that logic is potentially revisable, and the idea is pragmatist in spirit. It is hard to deny that intuitions about what makes a good argument control our logic. I say the world controls our intuitions.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions

14292	Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
	Full Idea: Dispositions of a thing are as important to us as overt behaviour, but they strike us by comparison as rather ethereal. So we are moved to enquire whether we can bring them down to earth, and explain disposition terms without reference to occult powers.
	From: Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954], II.3)
	A reaction: Mumford quotes this at the start of his book on dispositions, as his agenda. I suspect that the 'occult' aspect crept in because dispositions were based on powers, and the dominant view was that these were the immediate work of God.

14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem

18749	Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
	Full Idea: Goodman constructed arguments that purported to show that a satisfactory syntactic analysis of the confirmation relation can never be found. In response, philosophers of science tried to model it in probabilistic terms.
	From: report of Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954]) by Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R - Mathematical Methods in Philosophy 4
	A reaction: I take this idea to say that Bayesianism was developed in response to the grue problem. This is an interesting light on 'grue', which never bothered me much. The point is it scuppered formal attempts to model induction.

17646	Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
	Full Idea: Goodman has shown that no purely formal criterion can distinguish arguments that are intuitively sound inductive arguments for unsound ones: for every sound one there is an unsound one of the same form. The predicates in the argument make the difference.
	From: report of Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954]) by Hilary Putnam - Why there isn't a ready-made world 'Causation'
	A reaction: This is to swallow grue whole. I think a bit more chewing is called for. By this date Putnam strikes me as a crazy relativist who has lost his grip on the world. Note the word 'formal' - but Putnam seems to think the argument is important.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use

20949	Study the use of words, not their origins [Herder]
	Full Idea: Not how an expression can be etymologically derived and determined analytically, but how it is used is the question. Origin and use are often very different.
	From: Johann Gottfried Herder (works [1784], p.153), quoted by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 2 'Herder'
	A reaction: This doesn't quite say that meaning is use, and is basically an attack on the Etymological Fallacy (that origin gives meaning), but it is a strikingly modern view of language.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature

22086	The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
	Full Idea: Kierkegaard insisted that the most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion.
	From: report of Søren Kierkegaard (works [1845]) by Clare Carlisle - Kierkegaard: a guide for the perplexed Intro
	A reaction: Hume comes to mind for a similar view, but in character Hume was far more rational than Kierkegaard.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value

7669	We cannot attain all the ideals of every culture, so there cannot be a perfect life [Herder, by Berlin]
	Full Idea: For Herder, we cannot attain to the highest ideals of all the centuries and all the places at once, and since we cannot do that, the whole notion of the perfect life collapses.
	From: report of Johann Gottfried Herder (works [1784]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism Ch.3
	A reaction: Herder seems to be the father of modern cultural relativism. The idea is hard to challenge, but the ideals of some cultures should be ignored, if they diminish rather than enhance the good life for all.

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism

7668	Herder invented the idea of being rooted in (or cut off from) a home or a group [Herder, by Berlin]
	Full Idea: The whole notion of being at home, or being cut off from one's natural roots, the whole idea of roots, the whole idea of belonging to a group, a sect, a movement, was largely invented by Herder.
	From: report of Johann Gottfried Herder (works [1784], Ch.3) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism
	A reaction: Hm. Broad generalisations are an awful temptation in the history of ideas. As a corrective to this, trying reading the two Anglo-Saxon poems 'The Wanderer' and 'The Seafarer'. Very Germanic, I suppose. Interesting, though. Leads to Hegel's politics.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities

4794	We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman]
	Full Idea: Rather than a sentence being used for prediction because it is a law, it is called a law because it is used for prediction.
	From: Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954], p.21), quoted by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §5.4
	A reaction: This smacks of dodgy pragmatism, and sounds deeply wrong. The perception of a law has to be prior to making the prediction. Why do we make the prediction, if we haven't spotted a law. Goodman is mesmerised by language instead of reality.