Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Works of Love', 'Nature and Utility of Religion' and 'Putnam's Paradox'

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14 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
14212 A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
     Full Idea: A consistent theory is, by definition, one satisfied by some model; an isomorphic image of a model satisfies the same theories as the original model; to provide the making of an isomorphic image of any given model, a domain need only be large enough.
     From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Model')
     A reaction: This is laying out the ground for Putnam's model theory argument in favour of anti-realism. If you are chasing the one true model of reality, then formal model theory doesn't seem to offer much encouragement.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
14213 Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Anti-realists say the only world is imaginary, or only has the parts or classes or relations we divide it into, or doubt that reference to the world is possible, or doubt that our interpretations can achieve truth.
     From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Why Anti-R')
     A reaction: [compression of a paragraph on anti-realism] Lewis is a thoroughgoing realist. A nice example of the rhetorical device of ridiculing an opponent by suggesting that they don't even know what they themselves believe.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14210 A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The mereological sum of the coffee in my cup, the ink in this sentence, a nearby sparrow, and my left shoe is a miscellaneous mess of an object, yet its boundaries are by no means unrelated to the joints of nature.
     From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Might')
     A reaction: In that case they do, but if there are no atoms at the root of physics then presumably their could also be thoroughly jointless assemblages, involving probability distributions etc. Even random scattered atoms seem rather short of joints.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14215 Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Whatever happens in special cases, causal theories usually make it easy to be wrong about the thing we refer to.
     From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Is')
     A reaction: I suppose the point of this is that there are no checks and balances to keep reference in focus, but just a requirement to keep connected to an increasingly attenuated causal chain.
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
14209 Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Description theories of reference are supposed to have been well and truly refuted. I think not: ..it is still tenable with my seven points, and part of the truth of reference [7: rigidity, egocentric, tokens, causal, imperfect, indeterminate, families].
     From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'Glob Desc')
     A reaction: (The bit at the end refers to his seven points, on p.59). He calls his basic proposal 'causal descriptivism', incorporating his seven slight modifications of traditional descriptivism about reference.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
15998 Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: To love another in spite of his weaknesses and errors and imperfections is not perfect love. No, to love is to find him lovable in spite of, and together with, his weaknesses and errors and imperfections.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (Works of Love [1847], p.158)
     A reaction: A true romantic at heart, Kierkegaard ideally posits perfect love as unconditional love, and not just of good attributes, predicates and conditions. However, the real question for both me and Kierkegaard is, is perfect love desirable or even possible?[SY]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
21332 We don't get a love of 'order' from nature - which is thoroughly chaotic [Mill]
     Full Idea: Even the love of 'order' which is thought to be a following of the ways of nature is in fact a contradiction of them. All which people are accustomed to deprecate as 'disorder' is precisely a counterpart of nature's ways.
     From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.116)
     A reaction: The Greeks elevated the idea that the cosmos was orderly, but almost entirely based on the regular movement of the planets. They turned a blind eye to the messy bits of nature. As you magnify nature, order and chaos seem to alternate.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
21333 Evil comes from good just as often as good comes from evil [Mill]
     Full Idea: If good frequently comes out of evil, the converse fact, evil coming out of good, is equally common.
     From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.117)
     A reaction: Mill surmises that on the whole good comes from good, and evil from evil, but the point is that the evidence doesn't favour the production of increased good.
21335 Belief that an afterlife is required for justice is an admission that this life is very unjust [Mill]
     Full Idea: The necessity of redressing the balance [of injustice] is deemed one of the strongest arguments for another life after death, which amounts to an admission that the order of things in this life is often an example of injustice, not justice.
     From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874])
     A reaction: It certainly seems that an omnipotent God could administer swift justice in this life. If the whole point is that we need freedom of will, then why is justice administered at a much later date? The freedom seems to be illusory.
21334 No necessity ties an omnipotent Creator, so he evidently wills human misery [Mill]
     Full Idea: If a Creator is assumed to be omnipotent, if he bends to a supposed necessity, he himself makes the necessity which he bends to. If the maker of the world can all that he will, he wills misery, and there is no escape from the conclusion.
     From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.119)
     A reaction: If you add that the Creator is supposed to be perfectly benevolent, you arrive at the paradox which Mackie spells out. Is the correct conclusion that God exists, and is malevolent? Mill doesn't take that option seriously.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
21329 Nature dispenses cruelty with no concern for either mercy or justice [Mill]
     Full Idea: All of this [cruel killing] nature does with the most supercilious disregard both of mercy and of justice, emptying her shafts upon the best and noblest indifferently with the meanest and worst
     From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.115)
     A reaction: The existence of an afterlife at least offers an opportunity to rectify any injustice, but that hardly meets the question of why there was injustice in the first place. It would be odd if it actually is justice, but none of us can see why that is so.
21328 Killing is a human crime, but nature kills everyone, and often with great tortures [Mill]
     Full Idea: Killing, the most criminal act recognised by human laws, nature does once to every being that lives, and frequently after protracted tortures such as the greatest know monsters purposely inflicted on their living fellow creatures
     From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.115)
     A reaction: We certainly don't condemn lions for savaging gazelles, but the concept of a supreme mind controlling nature forces the question. Theology needs consistency between human and divine morality, and the supposed derivation of the former from the latter.
21330 Nature makes childbirth a miserable experience, often leading to the death of the mother [Mill]
     Full Idea: In the clumsy provision which nature has made for the perpetual renewal of animal life, ...no human being ever comes into the world but another human being is literally stretched on the rack for hours or day, not unfrequently issuing in death.
     From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.116)
     A reaction: This is a very powerful example, which is rarely cited in modern discussions.
21331 Hurricanes, locusts, floods and blight can starve a million people to death [Mill]
     Full Idea: Nature often takes the means by which we live. A single hurricane, a flight of locusts, or an inundation, or a trifling chemical change in an edible root, starve a million people.
     From: John Stuart Mill (Nature and Utility of Religion [1874], p.116)
     A reaction: [second sentence compressed] The 'edible root' is an obvious reference to the Irish potato famine. Some desertification had human causes, but these are telling examples.