22361
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Contextual values are acceptable in research, but not in its final evaluation [Reichenbach, by Reiss/Sprenger]
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Full Idea:
Reichenbach's claim is interpreted as saying that contextual values, which may have contributed to the discovery of a theory, are irrelevant for justifying the acceptance of a theory, and for assessing how evidence bears on theory.
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From:
report of Hans Reichenbach (On Probability and Induction [1938], pp.36-7) by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 3.2
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A reaction:
This influential idea is very helpful. It allows Galileo and co to pursus all sorts of highly personal and quirky lines of enquiry, because we only demand full objectivity when it is all over. Very good!
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9224
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Proceduralism offers a version of logicism with no axioms, or objects, or ontological commitment [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
My Proceduralism offers axiom-free foundations for mathematics. Axioms give way to the stipulation of procedures. We obtain a form of logicism, but with a procedural twist, and with a logic which is ontologically neutral, and no assumption of objects.
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From:
Kit Fine (Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects [2005], 1)
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A reaction:
[See Ideas 9222 and 9223 for his Proceduralism] Sounds like philosophical heaven. We get to take charge of mathematics, without the embarrassment of declaring ourselves to be platonists. Someone, not me, should evaluate this.
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9223
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My Proceduralism has one simple rule, and four complex rules [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
My Proceduralism has one simple rule (introduce an object), and four complex rules: Composition (combining two procedures), Conditionality (if A, do B), Universality (do a procedure for every x), and Iteration (rule to keep doing B).
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From:
Kit Fine (Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects [2005], 1)
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A reaction:
It sounds like a highly artificial and private game which Fine has invented, but he claims that this is the sort of thing that practising mathematicians have always done.
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