7920
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Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P]
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Full Idea:
Descriptive metaphysics (e.g. Aristotle and Kant) is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world; revisionary metaphysics (e.g. Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley) is concerned to produce a better structure.
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From:
Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
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A reaction:
This distinction by Strawson was incredibly helpful in reinstating metaphysics as a feasible activity. I don't want to abandon the revisionary version. We can hammer the current metaphysics into a more efficient shape, or even create new concepts.
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7922
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Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P]
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Full Idea:
Descriptive metaphysics is primarily concerned with categories and concepts which, in their fundamental character, change not at all. They are the commonplaces of the least refined thinking, and the indispensable core for the most sophisticated humans.
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From:
Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
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A reaction:
This seems to be the basic premise for a modern metaphysician such as E.J.Lowe, though such thinkers are not averse to suggesting clarifications of our conceptual scheme. The aim must be good foundations for a successful edifice of knowledge.
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7921
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Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P]
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Full Idea:
Up to a point, the reliance upon a close examination of the actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only sure, way in philosophy.
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From:
Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
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A reaction:
Probably the last bold assertion of ordinary language philosophy, though Strawson goes on the defend his 'deeper' version of the activity, which he says is 'descriptive metaphysics', rather than mere 'analysis'. Mere verbal analysis now looks hopeless.
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15590
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It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Once Frege had provided a clear syntactic account of variables and once Tarski had supplemented this with a rigorous semantic account, it would appear that there was nothing more of significance to be said.
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1)
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A reaction:
He later remarks that there are now three semantic accounts: the Tarskian, the instantial, and the algebraic [see xref ideas]. He offers a fourth account in his Semantic Relationism. This grows from his puzzles about variables.
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15591
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In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
When we consider the semantic role of 'x' and 'y' in two distinct expressions x>0 and y>0, their semantic roles seems the same. But in the same expression, such as x>y, their roles seem to be different.
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.A)
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A reaction:
[compressed] This new puzzle about variables leads Fine to say that the semantics of variables, and other expressions, is not intrinsic to them, but depends on their external relations. Variables denote any term - unless another variable got there first.
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9282
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I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P]
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Full Idea:
One can ascribed states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others. One can ascribe them to others only if one can identify other subjects of experience, and they cannot be identified only as subjects of experience.
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From:
Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4)
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A reaction:
A neat linguistic twist on the analogy argument, but rather dubious, if it is actually meant to prove that other minds exist. It is based on his view of predicates - see Idea 9281. If the rest of humanity are zombies, why would I not apply them?
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15602
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Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Mental files should be seen as a device for keeping track of when objects are coordinated (represented as-the-same) and, rather than understand coordination in terms of mental files, we should understand mental files in terms of coordination.
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 3.A)
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A reaction:
Personally I think that the metaphor of a 'label' is much closer to the situation than that of a 'file'. Thus my concept of Cicero is labelled 'Tully', 'Roman', 'orator', 'philosophical example'... My problem is to distinguish the concept from its labels.
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15589
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The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
For holists a proper theory will be broadly inferential, while for their opponents it will be representational in character, describing relations between expressions and reality. Representational semantics is atomist, holist semantics inferential.
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Intro)
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A reaction:
Fine presents these as the two main schools in semantics. His own theory then proposes a more holistic version of the Representational view. He seeks the advantages of Frege's position, but without 'sense'.
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15598
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We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
A 'semantics' is a body of semantic facts, and a 'semantic theory' is a body of semantic truths. The natural order is a theory being understood as truths, which state facts. Davidson, alas, reversed this order, with facts understood through theories.
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.C)
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A reaction:
[compressed; he cites Davidson 1967, and calls it 'one of the most unfortunate tendencies in modern philosophy of language, ..as if chemistry were understood in terms of formulae rather than chemical facts'].
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15600
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Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
The standard referentialist semantics for a language with names is that the semantic value of the name is the object, the content of a predicate is a property, and the content of a logical connective is an operation on propositions.
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.F)
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A reaction:
My particular bête noire is the idea that every predicate names a property. It is the tyranny of having to have a comprehensive semantic theory that drives this implausible picture. And I don't see how an object can be a semantic value…
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15601
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Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Fregeans emphasise an orientation towards the speaker: possession of sense makes language meaningful, and language relates to the world through sense. For the Referentialist its representational relationships make it meaningful, and relate it to the world
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.G)
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A reaction:
The Referentialist approach is for Kripkean fans of direct reference, rather than the Fregean reference through descriptions. I am inclined to favour the old-fashioned, deeply discredited, much mocked Fregean approach.
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15998
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Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard]
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Full Idea:
To love another in spite of his weaknesses and errors and imperfections is not perfect love. No, to love is to find him lovable in spite of, and together with, his weaknesses and errors and imperfections.
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From:
Søren Kierkegaard (Works of Love [1847], p.158)
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A reaction:
A true romantic at heart, Kierkegaard ideally posits perfect love as unconditional love, and not just of good attributes, predicates and conditions. However, the real question for both me and Kierkegaard is, is perfect love desirable or even possible?[SY]
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