14 ideas
16078 | Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: Arguments for statue being the clay are: that the clay is intrinsically like the statue, that the clay has the same atoms as the statue', that objects don't have modal properties such as being necessarily F, and the reference of 'property' changes. | |
From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], II) | |
A reaction: [my summary of the arguments she identifies - see text for details] Rudder Baker attempts to refute all four of these arguments, in defence of constitution as different from identity. |
16077 | The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: I argue that a lump of clay borrows the property of being a statue from the statue. The lump is a statue because, and only because, there is something that the lump constitutes that is a statue. | |
From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], n9) | |
A reaction: It is skating on very thin metaphysical ice to introduce the concept of 'borrowing' a property. I've spent the last ten minutes trying to 'borrow' some properties, but without luck. |
16080 | Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: A strong intuition shared by many philosophers is that some things that are in fact identical might not have been identical. | |
From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], IV) | |
A reaction: This flies in the face of the Kripkean view that if Hesperus=Phosphorus then the identity is necessary. I don't think I have an intuition that some given thing might have been two things - indeed the thought seems totally weird. Amoeba? Statue/clay? |
16082 | Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: The statue has relational properties which the lump of clay does not have essentially. | |
From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], V) | |
A reaction: She has in mind relations to the community of artistic life. I don't think this is convincing. Is something only a statue if it is validated by an artistic community? That sounds like relative identity, which she doesn't like. |
16066 | Additional or removal of any part changes a thing, so people are never the same person [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: If you add or take away a pebble, the same number does not remain. If you add to a length or cut off from it, the former measure does not remain. So human beings grow or waste away. Both you and I were, and shall be, other men. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B02), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 03.12 | |
A reaction: [The original is in dialogue form from a play. The context is a joke about not paying a debt.] Note the early date for this metaphysical puzzle. My new favourite reply is Chrysippus's Idea 16059; identity actually requires change. |
16076 | Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: I want to resuscitate an essentialist argument against the view that constitution is identity, of the form 'x is essentially F, y is not essentially F, so x is not y'. | |
From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], Intro) | |
A reaction: The point is that x might be essentially F and y only accidentally F. Thus a statue is essentially so, but a lump if clay is not essentially a statue. Another case where 'necessary' would do instead of 'essentially'. |
16081 | The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker] |
Full Idea: Constitution-without-identity is superior to constitution-as-identity in that it provides a unified view of the relation between persons and bodies, statues and pieces of bronze, and so on. | |
From: Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], IV) | |
A reaction: I have a problem with the intrinsic dualism of this whole picture. Clay needs shape, statues need matter - there aren't two 'things' here which have a 'relation'. |
436 | A dog seems handsome to another a dog, and even a pig to another pig [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: Dog seems very handsome to dog, and ox to ox, and donkey very handsome to donkey, and even pig to pig. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B05), quoted by (who?) - where? |
15998 | Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: To love another in spite of his weaknesses and errors and imperfections is not perfect love. No, to love is to find him lovable in spite of, and together with, his weaknesses and errors and imperfections. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Works of Love [1847], p.158) | |
A reaction: A true romantic at heart, Kierkegaard ideally posits perfect love as unconditional love, and not just of good attributes, predicates and conditions. However, the real question for both me and Kierkegaard is, is perfect love desirable or even possible?[SY] |
442 | Pleasures are like pirates - if you are caught they drown you in a sea of pleasures [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: Pleasures for mortals are like impious pirates, for the man who is caught by pleasures is immediately drowned in a sea of them. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B44), quoted by (who?) - where? | |
A reaction: Not all slopes are slippery. Plenty of people hold themselves to strict rules about alcohol or gambling. People have occasional treats. |
440 | Hands wash hands; give that you may get [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: The hand washes the hand; give something and you may get something. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B30), quoted by (who?) - where? |
441 | Against a villain, villainy is not a useless weapon [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: Against a villain, villainy is not a useless weapon. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B32), quoted by (who?) - where? |
439 | God knows everything, and nothing is impossible for him [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: Nothing escapes the divine, this you must realise. God himself is our overseer, and nothing is impossible for him. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B23), quoted by (who?) - where? |
443 | Human logos is an aspect of divine logos, and is sufficient for successful living [Epicharmus] |
Full Idea: Man has calculation, but there is also the divine logos. But human logos is sprung from the divine logos, and it brings to each man his means of life, and his maintenance. | |
From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B57), quoted by (who?) - where? |