7 ideas
16007 | I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: I always reason from existence, not towards existence. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Philosophical Fragments [1844], p.40) | |
A reaction: Kierkegaard's important premise to help show that theistic proofs for God's existence don't actually prove existence, but develop the content of a conception. [SY] |
16083 | Aristotelian matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity and substantiality of its object [Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: On the interpretation of Aristotelian matter that I shall propose, matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity, and hence the substantiality, of the object to which it contributes. | |
From: Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], Intro) | |
A reaction: Presumably the thought is that if an object is form+matter (hylomorphism), then forms are essentially unified, but matter is essentially unified and sloppy. |
16013 | Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: Can the necessary come into existence? That is a change, and everything that comes into existence demonstrates that it is not necessary. The necessary already 'is'. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Philosophical Fragments [1844], p.74) | |
A reaction: [SY] |
3161 | If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey on Dennett] |
Full Idea: If something has beliefs only if something else is disposed to "treat it" (i.e. think of it) as though it does, then we seem at least to have an infinite regress of appeals to believers. | |
From: comment on Daniel C. Dennett (works [1985]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 3.2.1 | |
A reaction: This sounds like a serious difficulty for behaviourists, but is not insurmountable. We need a community of interlocking behaviours, with a particular pattern of behaviour being labelled (for instrumental convenience) as 'beliefs'. |
3177 | You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Folk psychology is indispensable for driving a car, which would be terrifying if we didn't assume there were psychologically normal people behind the wheels. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (works [1985]), quoted by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind p.133 n35 | |
A reaction: Nice example. If someone is approaching you from the front on your side of the road, should you assume that they are 'psychologically normal'? Does psychology imply behaviour, or vice versa? |
17006 | Prime matter has no place in Aristotle's theories, and passages claiming it are misread [Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: I argue that prime matter has no place in Aristotle's elemental theory. ..References to prime matter are found in Aristotle's work because his theory was thought to need the doctrine. If I am right, these passages will all admit of another interpretation. | |
From: Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], App) | |
A reaction: If correct, this strikes me as important for the history of ideas, because scholastics got themselves in a right tangle over prime matter. See Pasnau on it. It pushed the 17th century into corpuscularianism. |
16093 | Prime matter is actually nothing and potentially everything (or potentially an element) [Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Prime matter is supposed to be actually nothing and potentially everything or, at any rate, potentially the simplest bodies - earth, water, air and fire. | |
From: Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: The view that the four elements turn out to be prime matter is distinctive of Gill's approach. Prime matter sounds like quark soup in the early universe. |