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All the ideas for 'works', 'The Identity of Indiscernibles' and 'Apology for Raymond Sebond'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Why can't a wise man doubt everything? [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: Why cannot a wise man dare to doubt anything and everything?
     From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0562)
     A reaction: This question seems to be the start of the Enlightenment Project, of attempting to prove everything. MacIntyre warns of the dangers of this in ethical theory. The story of modern philosophy is the discovery of its impossibility. E.g. Davidson on truth.
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
No wisdom could make us comfortably walk a wide beam if it was high in the air [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: Take a beam wide enough to walk along: suspend it between two towers: there is no philosophical wisdom, however firm, which could make us walk along it just as we would if we were on the ground.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0672)
     A reaction: This proposes great scepticism about the practical application of philosophical wisdom, but if we talk in terms of the wise assessment of risk in any undertaking, our caution on the raised beam makes perfectly good sense.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Virtue is the distinctive mark of truth, and its greatest product [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: The distinctive mark of the Truth we hold ought to be virtue, which is the most exacting mark of Truth, the closest one to heaven and the most worthy thing that Truth produces.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0493)
     A reaction: A long way from Tarski and minimalist theories of truth! But not so far from pragmatism. Personally I think Montaigne is making an important claim, which virtue theorists should be attempting to incorporate into their theory. Aristotle would sympathise.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The Axiom of Choice needs a criterion of choice [Black]
     Full Idea: Some mathematicians seem to think that talk of an Axiom of Choice allows them to choose a single member of a collection when there is no criterion of choice.
     From: Max Black (The Identity of Indiscernibles [1952], p.68)
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
We lack some sense or other, and hence objects may have hidden features [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: We may all lack some sense or other; because of that defect, most of the features of objects may be concealed from us.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0666)
     A reaction: This strikes me as simple, straightforward common sense, and right. I cannot make sense of the claim that reality really is just the way it appears. We do not have a built-in neutrino detector, for example.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Two things can only be distinguished by a distinct property or a distinct relation [Black]
     Full Idea: The only way we can discover that two things exist is by finding out that one has a quality not possessed by the other, or else that one has a relational characteristic that the other hasn't.
     From: Max Black (The Identity of Indiscernibles [1952], p.67)
     A reaction: At least this doesn't conflate relations with properties. Note that this idea is clearly epistemological, and in no way rules out the separateness of two objects which none of us can ever discern. Maybe the Earth has two Suns, which imperceptibly swap.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
The 'property' of self-identity is uselessly tautological [Black]
     Full Idea: Saying that 'a has the property of being identical with a' is a roundabout way of saying nothing - a useless tautology - and means not more than 'a is a'
     From: Max Black (The Identity of Indiscernibles [1952], p.66)
     A reaction: This matter resembles the problem of the number zero, and the empty set, which seem to be crucial entities for logicians, but of no interest to a common sense view of the world. So much the worse for logic, I am inclined to say.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If the universe just held two indiscernibles spheres, that refutes the Identity of Indiscernibles [Black]
     Full Idea: Isn't it logically possible that the universe should have contained nothing but two exactly similar spheres? ...So two things would have all their properties in common, and this would refute the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles.
     From: Max Black (The Identity of Indiscernibles [1952], p.67)
     A reaction: [Black is the originator of this famous example] It also appears to be naturally possible. An observer at an instant of viewing will discern a relational difference relative to themselves. Most people take Black's objection to be decisive.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Sceptics say there is truth, but no means of making or testing lasting judgements [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: Pyrrhonians say that truth and falsehood exist; within us we have means of looking for them, but not of making any lasting judgements: we have no touchstone.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0564)
     A reaction: This states the key difference between sceptics and relativists. The latter are more extreme as they say there is no such thing as truth. The former concede truth, and their scepticism is about the abilities of human beings. I am an anti-relativist.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
The soul is in the brain, as shown by head injuries [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: The seat of the powers of the soul is in the brain, as is clearly shown by the fact that wounds and accidents affecting the head immediately harm the faculties of the soul.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (Apology for Raymond Sebond [1580], p.0614)
     A reaction: At last someone has finally got the facts clear. It seems surprising that the Greeks never clearly grasped this piece of irrefutable evidence - even those Greeks who speculated that the brain was the key. Here we have a fixed fact of philosophy of mind.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
     Full Idea: Kierkegaard insisted that the most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion.
     From: report of Søren Kierkegaard (works [1845]) by Clare Carlisle - Kierkegaard: a guide for the perplexed Intro
     A reaction: Hume comes to mind for a similar view, but in character Hume was far more rational than Kierkegaard.