11 ideas
7426 | Critical philosophy is what questions domination at every level [Foucault] |
Full Idea: In its critical aspect, philosophy is that which calls into question domination at every level | |
From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.300) | |
A reaction: A very French view of the subject. It is tempting to say that they had their adolescent outburst in 1789, and it is time to grow up. With rights come responsibilities... |
7423 | Philosophy and politics are fundamentally linked [Foucault] |
Full Idea: The relationship between philosophy and politics is permanent and fundamental. | |
From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.293) | |
A reaction: This idea is one of the biggest gulfs between continental and analytical philosophy. Many aspects of philosophy are turning out to be much more social than analytical philosophers might have thought - epistemology, for example. |
7420 | When logos controls our desires, we have actually become the logos [Foucault] |
Full Idea: Plutarch says if you have mastered principles then logos will silence your desires like a master silencing a dog - in which case the logos functions without intervention on your part - you have become the logos, or the logos has become you. | |
From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.286) | |
A reaction: If you believe that logos is pure reason, you might be quite happy with this, but if you thought it was a cultural construct, you might feel that you had been cunningly enslaved. If I ask 'what is 7+6?', logos interrupts me to give the answer. |
23888 | Knowledge is beyond question, as an unavoidable component of thinking [Weil] |
Full Idea: The speaker refuses to pose the question of knowledge, since knowledge is a given that is mixed with thought, and that no thinking being can get away from. | |
From: Simone Weil (Philosophy [1941], p.42) | |
A reaction: On the whole I favour belief-first, but I take the primary purpose of minds to be navigation, and that needs facts, not hopeful beliefs. Weil's thought pushes me a bit towards the knowledge first view. |
7424 | Saying games of truth were merely power relations would be a horrible exaggeration [Foucault] |
Full Idea: When I talk about power relations and games of truth, I am absolutely not saying that games of truth are just concealed power relations - that would be a horrible exaggeration. | |
From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.296) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a denial of the more absurd forms of relativism. I think there is an interesting convergence between this kind of continental thinking, and the social view of justification found in the later work of Alvin Goldman. |
7422 | A subject is a form which can change, in (say) political or sexual situations [Foucault] |
Full Idea: The subject is not a substance but a form, which is not always identical to itself. You do not have the same relation to yourself when you go to vote and when you seek to fulfil your desires in a sexual relationship. | |
From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.290) | |
A reaction: I don't think I believe this. If it were true, the concept of 'sexual politics' would mean nothing to me. A brutal or sympathetic nature is likely to express itself in both situations. |
23887 | Art (like philosophy) establishes a relation between world and self, and between oneself and others [Weil] |
Full Idea: Isn't true art a method for establishing a certain relation between the world and the self, and between oneself and others, and isn't that the equivalent of philosophy? | |
From: Simone Weil (Philosophy [1941], p.38) | |
A reaction: I hope the definition of 'true' art doesn't have to conform to achieving this relation. I suppose each good work of art shows you a distinctive way of relating to the world. An interesting thought (as so often with this thinker). |
7419 | Ethics is the conscious practice of freedom [Foucault] |
Full Idea: What is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the conscious [réfléchie] practice of freedom? | |
From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.284) | |
A reaction: Makes Foucault sound very existentialist. I'm not sure I understand this kind of remark, given that serial killers seem to be exceptionally good at 'practising their freedom'. However, the idea is akin to Kant's notion of a truly good will (Idea 3710). |
15998 | Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard] |
Full Idea: To love another in spite of his weaknesses and errors and imperfections is not perfect love. No, to love is to find him lovable in spite of, and together with, his weaknesses and errors and imperfections. | |
From: Søren Kierkegaard (Works of Love [1847], p.158) | |
A reaction: A true romantic at heart, Kierkegaard ideally posits perfect love as unconditional love, and not just of good attributes, predicates and conditions. However, the real question for both me and Kierkegaard is, is perfect love desirable or even possible?[SY] |
7425 | The aim is not to eliminate power relations, but to reduce domination [Foucault] |
Full Idea: The problem is not to dissolve power relations in a utopia of transparent communications, but to acquire the rules of law, the management techniques, the morality, the practice of the self, that allows games of power with minimum domination. | |
From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.298) | |
A reaction: If you are a democrat it is hard to disagree with this, though I am still unclear why being dominated should rank as a total disaster. A healthy personal relationship might involve domination. 'Management techniques' is interesting. |
7418 | The idea of liberation suggests there is a human nature which has been repressed [Foucault] |
Full Idea: I am somewhat suspicious of the notion of liberation, because one runs the risk of falling back on the idea that there is a human nature, that has been concealed or alienated by mechanisms of repression. | |
From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.282) | |
A reaction: Personally I think there is (to some extent) a human nature, and that it fails to flourish if it gets too much 'liberation. However, the world contains a lot more repression than liberation, so we should all be fans of liberty. |