16908
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We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein]
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Full Idea:
The 'self-evidence' of which Russell talks so much can only be dispensed with in logic if language itself prevents any logical mistake.
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From:
comment on Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 4) by Robin Jeshion - Frege's Notion of Self-Evidence 4
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A reaction:
Jeshion presents this as a key idea, turning against Frege, and is the real source of the 'linguistic turn' in philosophy. If self-evidence is abandoned, then language itself is the guide to truth, so study language. I think I prefer Frege. See Quine?
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6563
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'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
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Full Idea:
Wittgenstein's 'fundamental idea' is that the 'and' and 'not' which guarantee the truth of "not p and not-p" are meaningful, but do not get their meaning by representing or standing for or referring to some kind of entity; they are non-referring terms.
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From:
report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], §37) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1
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A reaction:
Wittgenstein then defines the terms using truth tables, to show what they do, rather than what they stand for. This seems to me to be a candidate for the single most important idea in the history of the philosophy of logic.
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22323
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The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
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Full Idea:
The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body, or the human soul of wh9ch psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world.
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From:
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 1916. 2 Sep), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 58 Intro
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A reaction:
This is to treat the self as a phenomenon of thought, rather than of a human being. So if a machine could think, would it hence necessarily have a metaphysical self?
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15998
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Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard]
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Full Idea:
To love another in spite of his weaknesses and errors and imperfections is not perfect love. No, to love is to find him lovable in spite of, and together with, his weaknesses and errors and imperfections.
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From:
Søren Kierkegaard (Works of Love [1847], p.158)
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A reaction:
A true romantic at heart, Kierkegaard ideally posits perfect love as unconditional love, and not just of good attributes, predicates and conditions. However, the real question for both me and Kierkegaard is, is perfect love desirable or even possible?[SY]
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4678
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Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein]
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Full Idea:
If suicide is allowed, then everything is allowed. If anything is not allowed, then suicide is not allowed. This throws a light on the nature of ethics, for suicide is, so to speak, the elementary sin.
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From:
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], end), quoted by Jonathan Glover - Causing Death and Saving Lives §13
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A reaction:
This reveals the religious streak in Wittgenstein. I am reluctant to judge suicide, but this seems wrong. Should a 'jumper' worry if they land on someone else and kill them? Of course they should.
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16569
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The Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry of the philosophers need themselves to be explained [Descartes]
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Full Idea:
If you find it strange that in explaining these elements I do not use the qualities called Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry - as the philosophers do - I shall say to you that these qualities themselves seem to me to need explanation.
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From:
René Descartes (The World [1631], 9:25-6), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 1.3
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A reaction:
Nice. I take pushing the boundaries of explanation back (or down) to be the basic driving force of all human thought, in metaphysics as well as in physics.
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