Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Sentences' and 'In Metaphysics'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: Later standard theories said that a real distinction obtains between two things that can each exist without the other. For Scotus a real distinction requires only that one of the pair be able to exist without the other.
     From: report of John Duns Scotus (In Metaphysics [1304], V.5-6 n91) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.5
     A reaction: His example is the similarity relation, which is independent of the whiteness on which it is based (since the other thing can become non-white).
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being' [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: No substance is understood in its own right, except in the most universal of concepts, namely of 'being'.
     From: John Duns Scotus (In Metaphysics [1304], III n. 116), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.3
     A reaction: This is a fairly standard scholastic pessimism about knowing anything about substance. The modern view suggests that actually scientists know 'substance' pretty well.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
     Full Idea: Kierkegaard insisted that the most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion.
     From: report of Søren Kierkegaard (works [1845]) by Clare Carlisle - Kierkegaard: a guide for the perplexed Intro
     A reaction: Hume comes to mind for a similar view, but in character Hume was far more rational than Kierkegaard.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
Time is independent of motion, because God could stop everything for a short or long time [Crathorn, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: Suppose God annihilates everything, and then creates something new. The vacant interval could last a shorter or longer time, so there are facts about time independent of facts about motion.
     From: report of William Crathorn (Sentences [1335], I.16, concl.2) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.2
     A reaction: Not very persuasive if God is in some way 'timeless'. Crathorn would have loved Shoemaker's argument, where motionless time is the best explanation, rather than a possible explanation.