5 ideas
13166 | Essences are no use in mathematics, if all mathematical truths are necessary [Mancosu] |
Full Idea: Essences and essential properties do not seem to be useful in mathematical contexts, since all mathematical truths are regarded as necessary (though Kit Fine distinguishes between essential and necessary properties). | |
From: Paolo Mancosu (Explanation in Mathematics [2008], §6.1) | |
A reaction: I take the proviso in brackets to be crucial. This represents a distortion of notion of an essence. There is a world of difference between the central facts about the nature of a square and the peripheral inferences derivable from it. |
3916 | Hopi consistently prefers verbs and events to nouns and things [Whorf] |
Full Idea: Hopi, with its preference for verbs, as contrasted to our own liking for nouns, perpetually turns our propositions about things into propositions about events. | |
From: Benjamin Lee Whorf (An American Indian model of the Universe [1936], p.63) | |
A reaction: This should provoke careful thought about ontology - without concluding that it is entirely relative to language. |
3917 | Scientific thought is essentially a specialised part of Indo-European languages [Whorf] |
Full Idea: What we call "scientific thought" is a specialisation of the western Indo-European type of language. | |
From: Benjamin Lee Whorf (An American Indian model of the Universe [1936], p.246) | |
A reaction: This is the beginnings of an absurd extreme relativist view of science, based on a confusion about meaning and thought. |
16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
Full Idea: In Kripke's puzzle about belief, the subject has two distinct mental files about one and the same object. | |
From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (A Puzzle about Belief [1979]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.1 | |
A reaction: [Pierre distinguishes 'London' from 'Londres'] The Kripkean puzzle is presented as very deep, but I have always felt there was a simple explanation, and I suspect that this is it (though I will leave the reader to think it through, as I'm very busy…). |
3915 | The Hopi have no concept of time as something flowing from past to future [Whorf] |
Full Idea: A Hopi has no general notion or intuition of time as a smooth flowing continuum in which everything in the universe proceeds at an equal rate, out of a future, through a present, into a past. | |
From: Benjamin Lee Whorf (An American Indian model of the Universe [1936], p.57) | |
A reaction: If true, this would not so much support relativism of language as the view that that conception of time is actually false. |