7 ideas
21597 | Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson] |
Full Idea: Russell says the best chance of avoiding vagueness are the logical connectives. ...But the vagueness of 'true' and 'false' infects the logical connectives too. All words are vague. Russell concludes that all language is vague. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923]) by Timothy Williamson - Vagueness 2.4 | |
A reaction: This relies on the logical connectives being defined semantically, in terms of T and F, but that is standard. Presumably the formal uninterpreted syntax is not vague. |
9051 | Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: Russell takes it that logic assumes precision, and since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic at all. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923]) by R Keefe / P Smith - Intro: Theories of Vagueness §1 | |
A reaction: I find this view congenial. It seems to me that the necessary prelude to logic is to do everything you can to eliminate ambiguity and vagueness from the sentences at issue. We want the proposition, or logical form. If there isn't one, forget it? |
9054 | Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell] |
Full Idea: Vagueness and precision alike are characteristics which can only belong to a representation, of which language is an example. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923], p.62) | |
A reaction: Russell was the first to tackle the question of vagueness, and he may have got it right. If we are unable to decide which set an object belongs in (red or orange) that is a problem for our conceptual/linguistic scheme. The object still has a colour! |
16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
Full Idea: In Kripke's puzzle about belief, the subject has two distinct mental files about one and the same object. | |
From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (A Puzzle about Belief [1979]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.1 | |
A reaction: [Pierre distinguishes 'London' from 'Londres'] The Kripkean puzzle is presented as very deep, but I have always felt there was a simple explanation, and I suspect that this is it (though I will leave the reader to think it through, as I'm very busy…). |
7276 | All art is quite useless [Wilde] |
Full Idea: All art is quite useless. | |
From: Oscar Wilde (Preface to 'Dorian Gray' [1891]) | |
A reaction: Echoes Kant's thought that art is 'purposive without purpose'. Although I find Wilde's claims that morality has nothing to do with art to be naïve, I find this remark sympathetic. Art may play with moral feelings, but is unlikely to affect actions. |
7274 | Books are only well or badly written, not moral or immoral [Wilde] |
Full Idea: There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well written, or badly written. That is all. | |
From: Oscar Wilde (Preface to 'Dorian Gray' [1891]) | |
A reaction: This is simply false. Novels that are viciously (or subtly) racist, sexist, homophobic, or egotistical can obviously be immoral. I could write a nasty story about Oscar Wilde. It might, though, be very well written. If life is moral, so are novels. |
7275 | Having ethical sympathies is a bad mannerism of style in an artist [Wilde] |
Full Idea: No artist has ethical sympathies. An ethical sympathy in an artist is an unpardonable mannerism of style. | |
From: Oscar Wilde (Preface to 'Dorian Gray' [1891]) | |
A reaction: This has a Nietzschean suggestion that the artist is 'beyond good and evil', and operates on some higher level of values, which in Wilde's case seem to be purely aesthetic. You can't justify a callous murder by executing it beautifully. |