Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Puzzle about Belief', 'Prescriptivism' and 'works'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Everything is what it is, and not another thing [Butler]
     Full Idea: Everything is what it is, and not another thing.
     From: Joseph Butler (works [1732]), quoted by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 2.4
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
     Full Idea: In Kripke's puzzle about belief, the subject has two distinct mental files about one and the same object.
     From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (A Puzzle about Belief [1979]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.1
     A reaction: [Pierre distinguishes 'London' from 'Londres'] The Kripkean puzzle is presented as very deep, but I have always felt there was a simple explanation, and I suspect that this is it (though I will leave the reader to think it through, as I'm very busy…).
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B]
     Full Idea: Prescriptivism holds that if you think one 'ought' to do a certain kind of act, and yet you are not committed to doing that act in the relevant circumstances, then you either spoke insincerely, or are using the word 'ought' in a weak sense.
     From: Brad W. Hooker (Prescriptivism [1995], p.640)
     A reaction: So that's an 'ought', but not a 'genuine ought', then? (No True Scotsman move). Someone ought to rescue that drowning child, but I can't be bothered.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
Universal moral judgements imply the Golden Rule ('do as you would be done by') [Hooker,B]
     Full Idea: Prescriptivity is especially important if moral judgements are universalizable, for then we can employ golden rule-style reasoning ('do as you would be done by').
     From: Brad W. Hooker (Prescriptivism [1995], p.640)