Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Puzzle about Belief', 'Confessions of a Philosopher' and 'On Copernicanism and Relativity of Motion'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
Choose the true hypothesis, which is the most intelligible one [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: One should choose the more intelligible hypothesis, and the truth is nothing but its intelligibility.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Copernicanism and Relativity of Motion [1689], p.91)
     A reaction: This apparently simple observation strikes me as being rather profound. Our picture of the world is shaped entirely by what is intelligible to us. An odd notion of truth, though. The age of reason. See Idea 13158.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
The Copernican theory is right because it is the only one offering a good explanation [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The Copernican account is the truest theory, that is, the most intelligible theory and the only one capable of an explanation sufficient for a person of sound reason.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Copernicanism and Relativity of Motion [1689], p.92)
     A reaction: The word 'intelligible' here seems to be linked to the notion of a best explanation.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
     Full Idea: As a child it was incomprehensible to me that I did not experience going to sleep, and never remembered it. When my sister said 'Nobody remembers that', I just thought 'How does she know?'
     From: Bryan Magee (Confessions of a Philosopher [1997], Ch.I)
     A reaction: This is actually evidence for something - that we do not have some sort of personal identity which is separate from consciousness, so that "I am conscious" would literally mean that an item has a property, which it can lose.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
     Full Idea: In Kripke's puzzle about belief, the subject has two distinct mental files about one and the same object.
     From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (A Puzzle about Belief [1979]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.1
     A reaction: [Pierre distinguishes 'London' from 'Londres'] The Kripkean puzzle is presented as very deep, but I have always felt there was a simple explanation, and I suspect that this is it (though I will leave the reader to think it through, as I'm very busy…).