Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Puzzle about Belief', 'Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics' and 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: This is the first sentence of Moore's book, and a touchstone idea all the way through. It stands up well, because it says enough without committing to too much. I have to agree with it. It implies explanation as the key. I like generality too.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
     Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality.
     From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507)
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
     Full Idea: In Kripke's puzzle about belief, the subject has two distinct mental files about one and the same object.
     From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (A Puzzle about Belief [1979]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.1
     A reaction: [Pierre distinguishes 'London' from 'Londres'] The Kripkean puzzle is presented as very deep, but I have always felt there was a simple explanation, and I suspect that this is it (though I will leave the reader to think it through, as I'm very busy…).
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds [Chalmers, by Sider]
     Full Idea: For Chalmers, 'water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, in that it has different secondary intensions relative to different worlds of utterance.
     From: report of David J.Chalmers (Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics [2006]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 7.2
     A reaction: In this way 'water' is regarded as being like an indexical (such as 'I'), which has a fixed meaning component, and a second component which varies with different utterances. Maybe.