3 ideas
15549 | If it were true that nothing at all existed, would that have a truthmaker? [Lewis] |
Full Idea: If there was absolutely nothing at all, then it would have been true that there was nothing. Would there have been a truthmaker for this truth? | |
From: David Lewis (A world of truthmakers? [1998], p.220) | |
A reaction: This is a problem for Lewis's own claim that 'truth supervenes on being', as well as the more restricted truthmakers invoked by Armstrong. |
16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
Full Idea: In Kripke's puzzle about belief, the subject has two distinct mental files about one and the same object. | |
From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (A Puzzle about Belief [1979]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.1 | |
A reaction: [Pierre distinguishes 'London' from 'Londres'] The Kripkean puzzle is presented as very deep, but I have always felt there was a simple explanation, and I suspect that this is it (though I will leave the reader to think it through, as I'm very busy…). |
2116 | The concept of an existing thing must contain more than the concept of a non-existing thing [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There must be more in the concept of a thing which exists than in that of one which does not exist. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Principles of Indiscernibles [1696], p.134) |