3 ideas
18902 | Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson] |
Full Idea: The real objection to correspondence theories is that such theories fail to provide entities to which truth vehicles (as statements, sentence, or utterances) can be said to correspond. | |
From: Donald Davidson (The Structure and Content of Truth [1990], p.304), quoted by Fred Sommers - Intellectual Autobiography Notes 23 | |
A reaction: This is the remark which provoked Sommers to come out with Idea 18901, which strikes me as rather profound. |
4032 | The problem of universals is how many particulars can all be of the same 'type' [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The problem of universals is the problem of how numerically different particulars can nevertheless be identical in nature, all be of the same 'type'. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Nominalism and Realism [1978], p.41), quoted by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §7 | |
A reaction: A nice statement of the problem. As usual, the question is whether the 'sameness' is a feature of nature, or a product of human thought |
16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
Full Idea: In Kripke's puzzle about belief, the subject has two distinct mental files about one and the same object. | |
From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (A Puzzle about Belief [1979]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.1 | |
A reaction: [Pierre distinguishes 'London' from 'Londres'] The Kripkean puzzle is presented as very deep, but I have always felt there was a simple explanation, and I suspect that this is it (though I will leave the reader to think it through, as I'm very busy…). |