3 ideas
| 21239 | Philosophers are marked by a joint love of evidence and ambiguity [Merleau-Ponty] |
| Full Idea: The philosopher is marked by the distinguishing trait that he possesses inseparably the taste for evidence and the feeling for ambiguity. | |
| From: Maurice Merleau-Ponty (In Praise of Philosophy [1953], p.4), quoted by Sarah Bakewell - At the Existentialist Café 11 | |
| A reaction: I strongly approve of the idea that philosophers are primarily interested in evidence (rather than reason or logic), and I also like the idea that the ambiguous evidence is the most interesting. The mind looks physical and non-physical. |
| 23559 | We have the concept of 'knowledge' as a label for good informants [Craig, by Fricker,M] |
| Full Idea: Craig's explanation of why we have the concept of knowledge is that it arises from our fundamental need to distinguish good informants. | |
| From: report of Edward Craig (Knowledge and the State of Nature [1990]) by Miranda Fricker - Epistemic Injustice 6.1 | |
| A reaction: That is, why do we have the label 'knowledge', in addition to 'true belief'? This strikes me as a good explanation which had never occurred to me. Every social group needs to identify members who have some authority in knowledge of various areas of life. |
| 16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
| Full Idea: In Kripke's puzzle about belief, the subject has two distinct mental files about one and the same object. | |
| From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (A Puzzle about Belief [1979]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.1 | |
| A reaction: [Pierre distinguishes 'London' from 'Londres'] The Kripkean puzzle is presented as very deep, but I have always felt there was a simple explanation, and I suspect that this is it (though I will leave the reader to think it through, as I'm very busy…). |