6 ideas
9540 | A 'value-assignment' (V) is when to each variable in the set V assigns either the value 1 or the value 0 [Hughes/Cresswell] |
Full Idea: A 'value-assignment' (V) is when to each variable in the set V assigns either the value 1 or the value 0. | |
From: GE Hughes/M Cresswell (An Introduction to Modal Logic [1968], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: In the interpreted version of the logic, 1 and 0 would become T (true) and F (false). The procedure seems to be called nowadays a 'valuation'. |
9541 | The Law of Transposition says (P→Q) → (¬Q→¬P) [Hughes/Cresswell] |
Full Idea: The Law of Transposition says that (P→Q) → (¬Q→¬P). | |
From: GE Hughes/M Cresswell (An Introduction to Modal Logic [1968], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: That is, if the consequent (Q) of a conditional is false, then the antecedent (P) must have been false. |
9543 | The rules preserve validity from the axioms, so no thesis negates any other thesis [Hughes/Cresswell] |
Full Idea: An axiomatic system is most naturally consistent iff no thesis is the negation of another thesis. It can be shown that every axiom is valid, that the transformation rules are validity-preserving, and if a wff α is valid, then ¬α is not valid. | |
From: GE Hughes/M Cresswell (An Introduction to Modal Logic [1968], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: [The labels 'soundness' and 'consistency' seem interchangeable here, with the former nowadays preferred] |
9544 | A system is 'weakly' complete if all wffs are derivable, and 'strongly' if theses are maximised [Hughes/Cresswell] |
Full Idea: To say that an axiom system is 'weakly complete' is to say that every valid wff of the system is derivable as a thesis. ..The system is 'strongly complete' if it cannot have any more theses than it has without falling into inconsistency. | |
From: GE Hughes/M Cresswell (An Introduction to Modal Logic [1968], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: [They go on to say that Propositional Logic is strongly complete, but Modal Logic is not] |
16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
Full Idea: In Kripke's puzzle about belief, the subject has two distinct mental files about one and the same object. | |
From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (A Puzzle about Belief [1979]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.1 | |
A reaction: [Pierre distinguishes 'London' from 'Londres'] The Kripkean puzzle is presented as very deep, but I have always felt there was a simple explanation, and I suspect that this is it (though I will leave the reader to think it through, as I'm very busy…). |
18202 | The concept of a field gradually replaced the substances in explaining relations between charges [Einstein/Infeld] |
Full Idea: In the beginning the field concept was no more than a means of facilitating the understanding of phenomena. ...In the new field language it is the field and not the charges themselves which is essential. The substance was overshadowed by the field. | |
From: Einstein,A/Infeld,L (The Evolution of Physics [1938], p.151), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics II.4 | |
A reaction: This is very important for philosophical metaphysicians, especially those like me who want to explain the universe by the nature of the stuff that composes it. The 'stuff' had better not be simplistic individual 'substances'. |