Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Puzzle about Belief', 'The Human Animal' and 'Chomsky on himself'

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4 ideas

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body

16236	Maybe our persistence conditions concern bodies, rather than persons [Olson, by Hawley]
	Full Idea: Instead of attributing person-like persistence conditions to bodies, we could attribute body-like persistence conditions to persons, …so human persons are identical with human organisms.
	From: report of Eric T. Olson (The Human Animal [1997]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.10
	A reaction: In the case of pre-birth and advanced senility, Olson thinks we could have the body without the person, so person is a 'phase sortal' of bodies. A good theory, which seems to answer a lot of questions. 'Person' may be an abstraction.

6669	For 'animalism', I exist before I became a person, and can continue after it, so I am not a person [Olson, by Lowe]
	Full Idea: According to 'animalism', I existed before I was a person and I may well go one existing for some time after I cease to be a person; hence, I am not essentially a person, but a human organism.
	From: report of Eric T. Olson (The Human Animal [1997]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.10
	A reaction: There is a very real sense in which an extremely senile person has 'ceased to exist' (e.g. as the person I used to love). On the whole, though, I think that Olson is right, and yet 'person' is an important concept. Neither concept is all-or-nothing.

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files

16383	Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
	Full Idea: In Kripke's puzzle about belief, the subject has two distinct mental files about one and the same object.
	From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (A Puzzle about Belief [1979]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.1
	A reaction: [Pierre distinguishes 'London' from 'Londres'] The Kripkean puzzle is presented as very deep, but I have always felt there was a simple explanation, and I suspect that this is it (though I will leave the reader to think it through, as I'm very busy…).

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts

6649	Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe]
	Full Idea: Chomsky now contends that not only the syntax of natural language but also the concepts expressible in it have an innate basis.
	From: report of Noam Chomsky (Chomsky on himself [1994]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.7 n25
	A reaction: This seems to follow Fodor, who has been mocked for implying that we have an innate idea of a screwdriver etc. Note that Chomsky says concepts have an innate 'basis'. This fits well with modern (cautious) rationalism, with which I am happy.