3 ideas
18435 | Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round) [Rodriquez-Pereyra] |
Full Idea: Resemblance Nominalists cannot explain the resemblance between particulars in terms of their properties, because they explain particulars' properties in terms of their resemblances. | |
From: Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress [2001], p.397), quoted by Douglas Edwards - Properties 5.5.1 | |
A reaction: While resemblance does seem to be a primitive fact of experience, and it points us towards the properties, to say that resemblance explains properties is obviously (as so often...) getting things the wrong way round. Properties ARE resemblances?? |
10994 | Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read] |
Full Idea: Stalnaker proposes that a conditional is true if its consequent is true in the minimal revision in which the antecedent is true, that is, in the most similar possible world in which the antecedent is true. | |
From: report of Robert C. Stalnaker (works [1970]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.3 | |
A reaction: A similar account of counterfactuals was taken up by Lewis to give a (rather dubious) account of causation. |
16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
Full Idea: In Kripke's puzzle about belief, the subject has two distinct mental files about one and the same object. | |
From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (A Puzzle about Belief [1979]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.1 | |
A reaction: [Pierre distinguishes 'London' from 'Londres'] The Kripkean puzzle is presented as very deep, but I have always felt there was a simple explanation, and I suspect that this is it (though I will leave the reader to think it through, as I'm very busy…). |