16 ideas
9254 | In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false [Prichard] |
Full Idea: In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925]) | |
A reaction: A lovely remark! In a flash you suddenly see why philosophers expend such vast energy on such unpromising views of reality (e.g. idealism, panpsychism). This might be the best definition of philosophy I have yet discovered. |
12204 | The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: It is a widely accepted thesis that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §5) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt goes on to defend this standard view (against Dummett's defence of S4). The point, I take it, is that one can only assert that something is 'true in all possible worlds' only when the worlds are all accessible to one another. |
12195 | Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Our ordinary standards for deeming arguments to be sound vary greatly from context to context. Even the package tourist's syllogism ('It's Tuesday, so this is Belgium') may meet the operative standards for soundness. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: No doubt one could spell out the preconceptions of package tourist reasoning, and arrive at the logical form of the implication which is being offered. |
12199 | There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: There is a modal element in consequence, in its applicability to assessing reasoning from suppositions. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §2) |
12201 | We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A rule is to be rejected if it enables us to deduce from some premisses a purported conclusion that does not follow from them in the broad sense. The idea that deductions answer to consequence is incomprehensible if consequence consists in deducibility. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §2) |
12194 | Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Overt contradictions include formal contradictions of form 'B and not B', but I also take them to include 'This is red all over and green all over' and 'This is red and not coloured'. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], Intro) |
12198 | Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The geometrical style of formalization of logic is now little more than a quaint anachronism, largely because it fails to show logical truths for what they are: simply by-products of rules of inference that are applicable to suppositions. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: This is the rejection of Russell-style axiom systems in favour of Gentzen-style natural deduction systems (starting from rules). Rumfitt quotes Dummett in support. |
14532 | A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
Full Idea: Rumfitt argues that there is a distinctive notion of necessity implicated in the notion of logical consequence. | |
From: report of Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010]) by Bob Hale/ Aviv Hoffmann - Introduction to 'Modality' 2 |
12200 | A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: There is no reason to suppose that any statement that is logically necessary (in the present sense) is knowable a priori. ..If a statement is logically necessary, its negation will yield a contradiction, but that does not imply that someone could know it. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §2) | |
A reaction: This remark is aimed at Dorothy Edgington, who holds the opposite view. Rumfitt largely defends McFetridge's view (q.v.). |
12193 | Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: By the notion of 'logical necessity' I mean that there is a sense of 'necessary' for which 'It is necessary that A' implies and is implied by 'It is logically contradictory that not A'. ...From this, logical necessity is implicated in logical consequence. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt expresses a commitment to classical logic at this point. We will need to be quite sure what we mean by 'contradiction', which will need a clear notion of 'truth'.... |
12202 | Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: While Fine suggests defining a narrow notion of logical necessity in terms of metaphysical necessity by 'restriction' (to logical truths that can be defined in non-modal terms), this seems unpromising for broad logical necessity, which is modal. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] He cites Kit Fine 2002. Rumfitt glosses the non-modal definitions as purely formal. The metaphysics lurks somewhere in the proof. |
12203 | If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A world is usually taken to be a fully determinate way that things could have been; but then one might seriously wonder whether anyone is capable of 'considering' such a thing at all. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §4) | |
A reaction: This has always worried me. If I say 'maybe my coat is in the car', I would hate to think that I had to be contemplating some entire possible world (including all the implications of my coat not being on the hat stand). |
16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
Full Idea: In Kripke's puzzle about belief, the subject has two distinct mental files about one and the same object. | |
From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (A Puzzle about Belief [1979]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.1 | |
A reaction: [Pierre distinguishes 'London' from 'Londres'] The Kripkean puzzle is presented as very deep, but I have always felt there was a simple explanation, and I suspect that this is it (though I will leave the reader to think it through, as I'm very busy…). |
9256 | I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard] |
Full Idea: How can I be brought to see the truth of the principle of paying a debt except in connection with a particular instance? For this purpose any instance will do. If I cannot see that I ought to pay this debt, I shall not see that I ought to a debt. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925]) | |
A reaction: This isn't quite particularism, which would (I think) say that the degree of obligation will never be quite the same in any two situations, and so one instance will not suffice to understand the duty. |
9257 | The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard] |
Full Idea: Owing to the complication of human relations, the problem of what one ought to do from the point of view of life as a whole is one of intense difficulty. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925]) | |
A reaction: I suspect that the difficulty is not the problems engendered by complexity, but that there is no answer available from the most objective point of view. Morality simply is a matter of how daily life is conducted, with medium-term goals only. |
9255 | Seeing the goodness of an effect creates the duty to produce it, not the desire [Prichard] |
Full Idea: The appreciation of the goodness of the effect is different from desire for the effect, and will originate not the desire but the sense of obligation to produce it. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925]) | |
A reaction: A wonderful rebuttal of Hume, and a much better account of duty than Kant's idea that it arises from reason. Perception of value is what generates duty. And (with Frankfurt) we may say that love is what generates value. |