Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Puzzle about Belief', 'Examination of Sir Wm Hamilton's Philosophy' and 'Intro to 'Rationality in Greek Thought''

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4 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
23249 The early philosophers thought that reason has its own needs and desires [Frede,M]
     Full Idea: It is part of the notion of reason according to these philosophers [Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics] that reason has its own needs and desires.
     From: Michael Frede (Intro to 'Rationality in Greek Thought' [1996], p.5)
     A reaction: This sounds as if reason is treated as a separate person within a person. Anyone solving a logical puzzle feels that reason has its own compulsion. 'Boulesis' is the desire characteristic of reason.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
3583 External objects are permanent possibilities of sensation [Mill]
     Full Idea: External objects are permanent possibilities of sensation.
     From: John Stuart Mill (Examination of Sir Wm Hamilton's Philosophy [1865]), quoted by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch.9
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
3537 I judge others' feeling by analogy with my body and behaviour [Mill]
     Full Idea: I conclude other humans have feelings like me because they have bodies like mine (which I know in my case to be antecedent to feelings), and because they exhibit acts and outwards signs which I know in my own case to be caused by feelings.
     From: John Stuart Mill (Examination of Sir Wm Hamilton's Philosophy [1865], p.243), quoted by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 8.2
     A reaction: It is hard to see anything further that can be added to the 'other minds' question. Behaviour is highly relevant (imagine meeting a human who talked like a robot), but so are bodies (imagine a tin box that talked like Marilyn Monroe).
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
16383 Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
     Full Idea: In Kripke's puzzle about belief, the subject has two distinct mental files about one and the same object.
     From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (A Puzzle about Belief [1979]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.1
     A reaction: [Pierre distinguishes 'London' from 'Londres'] The Kripkean puzzle is presented as very deep, but I have always felt there was a simple explanation, and I suspect that this is it (though I will leave the reader to think it through, as I'm very busy…).