6855
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Interesting philosophers hardly every give you explicitly valid arguments [Martin,M]
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Full Idea:
Notice that very few philosophers - certainly almost none of the ones who are interesting to read - give you explicitly valid arguments.
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From:
Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.134)
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A reaction:
I never thought that was going to happen in philosophy. What I do get is, firstly, lots of interesting reasons for holding beliefs, and a conviction that good beliefs need good reasons, and, secondly, a really coherent view of the world.
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6856
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Valid arguments can be rejected by challenging the premises or presuppositions [Martin,M]
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Full Idea:
Putting forward a valid argument isn't necessarily going to succeed in getting someone to see things your way, because if they don't accept the conclusion, they ask which premises they should reject, or whether an illegitimate assumption is being made.
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From:
Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.136)
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A reaction:
Valid arguments are still vital. It is just that good philosophers realise the problem noted here, and spend huge stretches of discussion on establishing acceptance of premises, and showing that there are no dodgy presuppositions.
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8790
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The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying [Chisholm]
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Full Idea:
In my opinion, the 'doctrine of the given' is correct in saying that there are some beliefs or statements which are 'self-justifying' and that among such beliefs are statements some of which concern appearances or 'ways of being appeared to'.
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From:
Roderick Chisholm (The Myth of the Given [1964], §12)
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A reaction:
To boldly assert that they are 'self-justifying' invites a landslide of criticisms, pointing at a regress. It might be better to say they are self-evident, or intuitively known, or primitive, or true by the natural light of reason.
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