Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Puzzle about Belief', 'General Draft' and 'Intro to 2nd ed of Principia Mathematica'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is actually homesickness - the urge to be everywhere at home.
     From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 45)
     A reaction: The idea of home [heimat] is powerful in German culture. The point of romanticism was seen as largely concerning restless souls like Byron and his heroes, who do not feel at home. Hence ironic detachment.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Given all true atomic propositions, in theory every other truth can thereby be deduced [Russell]
     Full Idea: Given all true atomic propositions, together with the fact that they are all, every other true proposition can theoretically be deduced by logical methods.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Intro to 2nd ed of Principia Mathematica [1925], p.xv)
     A reaction: This is evidently his strongest statement of the ideal underlying logical atomism. The atoms were initially sense-date, but then became atomic propositions saying an object has a property.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis]
     Full Idea: An absolute drive toward perfection and completeness is an illness, as soon as it shows itself to be destructive and averse toward the imperfect, the incomplete.
     From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 33)
     A reaction: Deep and true! Novalis seems to be a particularist - hanging on to the fine detail of life, rather than being immersed in the theory. These are the philosophers who also turn to literature.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
     Full Idea: In Kripke's puzzle about belief, the subject has two distinct mental files about one and the same object.
     From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (A Puzzle about Belief [1979]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.1
     A reaction: [Pierre distinguishes 'London' from 'Londres'] The Kripkean puzzle is presented as very deep, but I have always felt there was a simple explanation, and I suspect that this is it (though I will leave the reader to think it through, as I'm very busy…).