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All the ideas for 'A Puzzle about Belief', 'Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point' and 'works'

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7 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction

10121	Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor lack of contradiction a sign of truth [Pascal]
	Full Idea: Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor the lack of contradiction a sign of truth.
	From: Blaise Pascal (works [1660]), quoted by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6
	A reaction: [Quoted in Auden and Kronenberger's Book of Aphorisms] Presumably we would now say that contradiction is a purely formal, syntactic notion, and not a semantic one. If you hit a contradiction, something has certainly gone wrong.

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files

16383	Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
	Full Idea: In Kripke's puzzle about belief, the subject has two distinct mental files about one and the same object.
	From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (A Puzzle about Belief [1979]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.1
	A reaction: [Pierre distinguishes 'London' from 'Londres'] The Kripkean puzzle is presented as very deep, but I have always felt there was a simple explanation, and I suspect that this is it (though I will leave the reader to think it through, as I'm very busy…).

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism

4125	Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B]
	Full Idea: In Hare's theory I apply a "role-reversal test", and then acquire an actual agglomeration of preferences that apply to the hypothetical situation. The result is utilitarianism.
	From: report of Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
	A reaction: It hits that traditional stumbling block, of why I should care about the preferences of others. Pure reason and empathy are the options (Kant or Hume). I may, however, lack both.

4126	If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare]
	Full Idea: Hare's version of utilitarianism requires an agent to abandon any deeply held principle or conviction if a large enough aggregate of contrary preferences, of whatever kind, favours a contrary action.
	From: comment on Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
	A reaction: This nicely attacks any impersonal moral theory, whether it is based on reason or preferences. But where did my personal ideals come from?

4127	If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare]
	Full Idea: If there is to be total identification with others, then if another's preferences are mistaken, the preferences I imagine myself into are equally mistaken, and if 'identification' is the point, they should remain mistaken.
	From: comment on Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
	A reaction: Yes. The core of morality must be judgement. Robots can implement universal utilitarian rules, but they could end up promoting persecutions of minorities.

22483	A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare]
	Full Idea: We say something prescriptive if and only if, for some act A, some situation S and some person R, if P were to assent (orally) to what we say, and not, in S, do A, he logically must be assenting insincerely.
	From: Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981], p.21), quoted by Philippa Foot - Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? p.190
	A reaction: Foot offers this as Hare's most explicit definition. The use of algebra strikes me as ludicrous. In logic letters have the virtue of not shifting their meaning during an argument, but that is not required here.

23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies

4360	By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright [Hare]
	Full Idea: By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright.
	From: Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981], Ch.11)
	A reaction: Yes. This is the route which takes us from enlightened self-interest to a vision of true morality. Virtue is found to be its own reward, thought that is not how we became virtuous to begin with.