4 ideas
11074 | 'It is true that this follows' means simply: this follows [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: The proposition: "It is true that this follows from that" means simply: this follows from that. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics [1938], p.38), quoted by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 6 | |
A reaction: Presumably this remark is simply expressing Wittgenstein's later agreement with the well-known view of Ramsey. Early Wittgenstein had endorsed a correspondence view of truth. |
11073 | Two and one making three has the necessity of logical inference [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: "But doesn't it follow with logical necessity that you get two when you add one to one, and three when you add one to two? and isn't this inexorability the same as that of logical inference? - Yes! it is the same. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics [1938], p.38), quoted by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 6 | |
A reaction: This need not be a full commitment to logicism - only to the fact that the inferential procedures in mathematics are the same as those of logic. Mathematics could still have further non-logical ingredients. Indeed, I think it probably does. |
19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
Full Idea: A Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well justified without being knowledge. Its justificatory support is also fallible, ...and there is considerable luck in how the belief combnes being true with being justified. | |
From: Stephen Hetherington (The Gettier Problem [2011], 5) | |
A reaction: This makes luck the key factor. 'Luck' is a rather vague concept, and so the sort of luck involved must first be spelled out. Or the varieties of luck that can produce this outcome. |
16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
Full Idea: In Kripke's puzzle about belief, the subject has two distinct mental files about one and the same object. | |
From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (A Puzzle about Belief [1979]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.1 | |
A reaction: [Pierre distinguishes 'London' from 'Londres'] The Kripkean puzzle is presented as very deep, but I have always felt there was a simple explanation, and I suspect that this is it (though I will leave the reader to think it through, as I'm very busy…). |