7 ideas
| 8920 | Equivalence relations are reflexive, symmetric and transitive, and classify similar objects [Lipschutz] |
| Full Idea: A relation R on a non-empty set S is an equivalence relation if it is reflexive (for each member a, aRa), symmetric (if aRb, then bRa), and transitive (aRb and bRc, so aRc). It tries to classify objects that are in some way 'alike'. | |
| From: Seymour Lipschutz (Set Theory and related topics (2nd ed) [1998], 3.9) | |
| A reaction: So this is an attempt to formalise the common sense notion of seeing that two things have something in common. Presumably a 'way' of being alike is going to be a property or a part |
| 8800 | If you would deny a truth if you know the full evidence, then knowledge has social aspects [Harman, by Sosa] |
| Full Idea: If one reads of a genuine assassination, but then fails to read the reports next day which untruthfully deny the event, one probably does not know of the event. But we must conclude that knowledge has a further 'social aspect'. | |
| From: report of Gilbert Harman (Induction [1970], §IV) by Ernest Sosa - The Raft and the Pyramid Appx | |
| A reaction: I doubt if this is enough to support an externalist account of defeasibility. Wise people don't 'know' of an event after one report. For 24 hours the Royalists thought they had won Marston Moor! You know he's dead when you see the Zapruder film. |
| 22410 | Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: One might have the idea that the unthinkable was itself a moral category. ...Regarding certain things even as alternatives is itself something to be regarded as dishonourable or morally absurd. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2) | |
| A reaction: He's very tentative about this, but I think it is a powerful moral idea. See Kekes. He is particularly aiming at utilitarians, who happily assess vile possibilities. |
| 22408 | Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The emphasis on the necessary comparability of situations is a peculiar feature of consequentialism in general. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2) | |
| A reaction: A nice point. Utilitarians might achieve comparison by totting up the happiness in each situation, but once you include the consequences of the consequences the problems are obvious. Was 1789 a good thing? Too early to say. |
| 22411 | For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Making the best of a bad job is a consequentialist maxim, and it will have something to say even pn the difference between massacring seven million and massacring seven million and one. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2) | |
| A reaction: If every life counts, the consequentialists have got something right here. Not caring exactly how many were massacred is a sort of callousness (even when the number can't be established). |
| 22409 | We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: If the goodness of the world were to consist in people's fulfilling their obligations, it would by no means follow that one of my obligations was to bring it about that other people kept their obligations | |
| From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2) | |
| A reaction: If the maxim of my action is 'ensure that everyone does their duty', presumably that can be universalised. Nelson thought so. It just sounds like a hideous world of self-righteous interference. |
| 22407 | Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Utilitarianism cannot hope to make sense, at any serious level, of integrity. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 1) | |
| A reaction: There will be obvious problems with this. 'My whole platoon got killed, but looking on the bright side, I preserved my integrity'. Once a theory commits entirely to one value, it then has no way to make sense of rival values. |