Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Set Theory and related topics (2nd ed)', 'Letters to Lelong' and 'Grounding: an opinionated introduction'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics

17266	Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: In the heyday of modal logic, philosophers typically tried to account for any metaphysical notions in modal terms.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.4)
	A reaction: Lewisian realism about possible worlds actually gets rid of purely 'modal' terms, but I suppose they include possible worlds in their remark. Annoying for modal logicians to be told they had a 'heyday' - a nice example of the rhetoric of philosophy.

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason

17263	Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: What is most puzzling about the rationalist tradition is the steadfast certainty with which the Principle of Sufficient Reason was often accepted, since it in effect denies that there are fundamental facts.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.2)
	A reaction: A very simple and interesting observation. The principle implies either a circle of reasons, or an infinite regress of reasons. Nothing can be labelled as 'primitive' or 'foundational' or 'given'. The principle is irrational!

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes

8920	Equivalence relations are reflexive, symmetric and transitive, and classify similar objects [Lipschutz]
	Full Idea: A relation R on a non-empty set S is an equivalence relation if it is reflexive (for each member a, aRa), symmetric (if aRb, then bRa), and transitive (aRb and bRc, so aRc). It tries to classify objects that are in some way 'alike'.
	From: Seymour Lipschutz (Set Theory and related topics (2nd ed) [1998], 3.9)
	A reaction: So this is an attempt to formalise the common sense notion of seeing that two things have something in common. Presumably a 'way' of being alike is going to be a property or a part

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding

17270	Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: We may take existential dependence to be a relation induced by certain cases of grounding, but one may also think that facts about existential dependence are prior to corresponding ground claims, and in fact ground those claims.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.3)
	A reaction: I would vote for grounding, since dependence seems more abstract, and seems to demand explanation, whereas grounding seems more like a feature of reality, and to resist further intrinsic explanation (on the whole).

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation

17268	Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: To us it seems advisable to separate the objective notion of grounding, which belongs to the field of metaphysics, from the epistemically loaded notion of explanation.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.2)
	A reaction: Paul Audi is the defender of the opposite view. I'm with Audi. The 'epistemically loaded' pragmatic aspect is just contextual - that we have different interests in different aspects of the grounding on different occasions.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts

17267	The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: There is a disagreement on the issue of factual identity, concerning the 'granularity' of facts, the question of how fine-grained they are.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 3.3)
	A reaction: If they are very fine-grained, then no two descriptions of a supposed fact will capture the same details. If we go broadbrush, facts become fuzzy and less helpful. 'Fact' was never going to be a clear term.

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces

13097	Force in substance makes state follow state, and ensures the very existence of substance [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: By the force I give to substances, I understand a state from which another state follows, if nothing prevents it. ...I dare say that without force, there would be no substance.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Lelong [1712], 1712), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 7.1
	A reaction: [the whole quote is interesting] This remark, more than any other I have found, places force at the centre of Leibniz's metaphysics. He is using it to resist Spinoza's one-substance view.