11 ideas
7920 | Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: Descriptive metaphysics (e.g. Aristotle and Kant) is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world; revisionary metaphysics (e.g. Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley) is concerned to produce a better structure. | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro) | |
A reaction: This distinction by Strawson was incredibly helpful in reinstating metaphysics as a feasible activity. I don't want to abandon the revisionary version. We can hammer the current metaphysics into a more efficient shape, or even create new concepts. |
7922 | Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: Descriptive metaphysics is primarily concerned with categories and concepts which, in their fundamental character, change not at all. They are the commonplaces of the least refined thinking, and the indispensable core for the most sophisticated humans. | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the basic premise for a modern metaphysician such as E.J.Lowe, though such thinkers are not averse to suggesting clarifications of our conceptual scheme. The aim must be good foundations for a successful edifice of knowledge. |
7921 | Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: Up to a point, the reliance upon a close examination of the actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only sure, way in philosophy. | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro) | |
A reaction: Probably the last bold assertion of ordinary language philosophy, though Strawson goes on the defend his 'deeper' version of the activity, which he says is 'descriptive metaphysics', rather than mere 'analysis'. Mere verbal analysis now looks hopeless. |
8920 | Equivalence relations are reflexive, symmetric and transitive, and classify similar objects [Lipschutz] |
Full Idea: A relation R on a non-empty set S is an equivalence relation if it is reflexive (for each member a, aRa), symmetric (if aRb, then bRa), and transitive (aRb and bRc, so aRc). It tries to classify objects that are in some way 'alike'. | |
From: Seymour Lipschutz (Set Theory and related topics (2nd ed) [1998], 3.9) | |
A reaction: So this is an attempt to formalise the common sense notion of seeing that two things have something in common. Presumably a 'way' of being alike is going to be a property or a part |
9295 | Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann] |
Full Idea: It is not true that only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can all be characterized. | |
From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This is why it is so important to distinguish the actual properties in nature from those that can be fancifully hypothesized by a linguistic being. Is there any limit to the possible number of levels of meta-properties? |
9282 | I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: One can ascribed states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others. One can ascribe them to others only if one can identify other subjects of experience, and they cannot be identified only as subjects of experience. | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4) | |
A reaction: A neat linguistic twist on the analogy argument, but rather dubious, if it is actually meant to prove that other minds exist. It is based on his view of predicates - see Idea 9281. If the rest of humanity are zombies, why would I not apply them? |
9263 | A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type. | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4) | |
A reaction: As Frankfurt points out, merely requiring the entity to be 'conscious' is a grossly inadequate definition of what we mean by a person, which is typically a being that is self-aware and capable of rational decisions between alternatives. |
9293 | Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann] |
Full Idea: Since the interaction of bodies themselves involves energy-flow, it looks as if interaction between body and spirit ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world. | |
From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: A nice statement of an important argument. It forces the dualist to go the whole way, asserting that not only is the mind immaterial, but that it can be active without energy, and cover its traces in the physical world. Doesn't look good. |
9281 | The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: The idea of a predicate is correlative with a range of distinguishable individuals of which the predicate can be significantly, though not necessarily truly, affirmed. | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], 3.4 n1) | |
A reaction: Said to be one of Strawson's most important ideas. The idea is that you understand a predicate if you understand its range, not just a one-off application. So you must understand the implied universal, whatever that is. |
9292 | The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann] |
Full Idea: On the whole, the Soul has no capacities which belong to it pre-eminently in the way that thinking 'belongs' to the mind. | |
From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: There are no phenomena which have to be saved by postulating a soul. It lacks a function within a human being, but it has a crucial function within a large theological picture. |
9294 | No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann] |
Full Idea: There are no individuating marks which could serve to differentiate one Soul from another. | |
From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Presumably they could have at least much identity as two different electrons (if they are in space-time?). It is hard to see why anyone would be interested in their 'own' immortality, if loss of all individuality was a condition. |