14 ideas
8920 | Equivalence relations are reflexive, symmetric and transitive, and classify similar objects [Lipschutz] |
Full Idea: A relation R on a non-empty set S is an equivalence relation if it is reflexive (for each member a, aRa), symmetric (if aRb, then bRa), and transitive (aRb and bRc, so aRc). It tries to classify objects that are in some way 'alike'. | |
From: Seymour Lipschutz (Set Theory and related topics (2nd ed) [1998], 3.9) | |
A reaction: So this is an attempt to formalise the common sense notion of seeing that two things have something in common. Presumably a 'way' of being alike is going to be a property or a part |
17963 | The facts of geometry, arithmetic or statics order themselves into theories [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: The facts of geometry order themselves into a geometry, the facts of arithmetic into a theory of numbers, the facts of statics, electrodynamics into a theory of statics, electrodynamics, or the facts of the physics of gases into a theory of gases. | |
From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [03]) | |
A reaction: This is the confident (I would say 'essentialist') view of axioms, which received a bit of a setback with Gödel's Theorems. I certainly agree that the world proposes an order to us - we don't just randomly invent one that suits us. |
17966 | Axioms must reveal their dependence (or not), and must be consistent [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: If a theory is to serve its purpose of orienting and ordering, it must first give us an overview of the independence and dependence of its propositions, and second give a guarantee of the consistency of all of the propositions. | |
From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [09]) | |
A reaction: Gödel's Second theorem showed that the theory can never prove its own consistency, which made the second Hilbert requirement more difficult. It is generally assumed that each of the axioms must be independent of the others. |
17967 | To decide some questions, we must study the essence of mathematical proof itself [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: It is necessary to study the essence of mathematical proof itself if one wishes to answer such questions as the one about decidability in a finite number of operations. | |
From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [53]) |
17965 | The whole of Euclidean geometry derives from a basic equation and transformations [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: The linearity of the equation of the plane and of the orthogonal transformation of point-coordinates is completely adequate to produce the whole broad science of spatial Euclidean geometry purely by means of analysis. | |
From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [05]) | |
A reaction: This remark comes from the man who succeeded in producing modern axioms for geometry (in 1897), so he knows what he is talking about. We should not be wholly pessimistic about Hilbert's ambitious projects. He had to dig deeper than this idea... |
17964 | Number theory just needs calculation laws and rules for integers [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: The laws of calculation and the rules of integers suffice for the construction of number theory. | |
From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [05]) | |
A reaction: This is the confident Hilbert view that the whole system can be fully spelled out. Gödel made this optimism more difficult. |
472 | No things would be clear to us as entity or relationships unless there existed Number and its essence [Philolaus] |
Full Idea: No existing things would be clear to anyone, either in themselves or in their relationship to one another, unless there existed Number and its essence. | |
From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B11), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.03.8 |
1518 | Everything must involve numbers, or it couldn't be thought about or known [Philolaus] |
Full Idea: Everything which is known has number, because otherwise it is impossible for anything to be the object of thought or knowledge. | |
From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B04), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7b |
1519 | Harmony must pre-exist the cosmos, to bring the dissimilar sources together [Philolaus] |
Full Idea: It would have been impossible for the dissimilar and incompatible sources to have been made into an orderly universe unless harmony had been present in some form or other. | |
From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B06), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7d |
473 | There is no falsehood in harmony and number, only in irrational things [Philolaus] |
Full Idea: The nature of number and harmony admits of no falsehood; for this is unrelated to them. Falsehood and envy belong to the nature of the Unlimited and the Unintelligent and the Irrational. | |
From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B11), quoted by (who?) - where? |
469 | Existing things, and hence the Cosmos, are a mixture of the Limited and the Unlimited [Philolaus] |
Full Idea: Since it is plain that existing things are neither wholly from the Limiting, nor wholly from the Unlimited, clearly the cosmos and its contents were fitted together from both the Limiting and the Unlimited. | |
From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B02), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7a |
476 | Self-created numbers make the universe stable [Philolaus] |
Full Idea: Number is the ruling and self-created bond which maintains the everlasting stability of the contents of the universe. | |
From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B23), quoted by (who?) - where? |
17968 | By digging deeper into the axioms we approach the essence of sciences, and unity of knowedge [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: By pushing ahead to ever deeper layers of axioms ...we also win ever-deeper insights into the essence of scientific thought itself, and become ever more conscious of the unity of our knowledge. | |
From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [56]) | |
A reaction: This is the less fashionable idea that scientific essentialism can also be applicable in the mathematic sciences, centring on the project of axiomatisation for logic, arithmetic, sets etc. |
1787 | Philolaus was the first person to say the earth moves in a circle [Philolaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Philolaus was the first person to affirm that the earth moves in a circle. | |
From: report of Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 08.Ph.3 |