13966
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Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames]
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Full Idea:
The golden age of analytic philosophy (mid 20th c) was when necessary, a priori and analytic were one, all possibility was linguistic possibility, and the linguistic turn gave philosophy a respectable subject matter (language), and precision and rigour.
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From:
Scott Soames (Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori [2006], p.166)
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A reaction:
Gently sarcastic, because Soames is part of the team who have put a bomb under this view, and quite right too. Personally I think the biggest enemy in all of this lot is not 'language' but 'rigour'. A will-o-the-wisp philosophers dream of.
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13974
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If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames]
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Full Idea:
If all of philosophy is the analysis of meaning, and meaning is fundamentally transparent to competent speakers, there is little room for philosophically significant explanations and theories, since they will be necessary or a priori, or both.
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From:
Scott Soames (Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori [2006], p.186)
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A reaction:
He cites the later Wittgenstein as having fallen into this trap. I suppose any area of life can have its specialists, but I take Shakespeare to be a greater master of English than any philosopher I have ever read.
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8920
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Equivalence relations are reflexive, symmetric and transitive, and classify similar objects [Lipschutz]
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Full Idea:
A relation R on a non-empty set S is an equivalence relation if it is reflexive (for each member a, aRa), symmetric (if aRb, then bRa), and transitive (aRb and bRc, so aRc). It tries to classify objects that are in some way 'alike'.
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From:
Seymour Lipschutz (Set Theory and related topics (2nd ed) [1998], 3.9)
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A reaction:
So this is an attempt to formalise the common sense notion of seeing that two things have something in common. Presumably a 'way' of being alike is going to be a property or a part
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13972
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Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]
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Full Idea:
Two-dimensionalism is a fundamentally anti-Kripkean attempt to reinstate descriptivism about names and natural kind terms, to reconnect necessity and apriority to analyticity, and return philosophy to analytic paradigms of its golden age.
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From:
Scott Soames (Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori [2006], p.183)
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A reaction:
I presume this is right, and it is so frustrating that you need Soames to spell it out, when Chalmers is much more low-key. Philosophers hate telling you what their real game is. Why is that?
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