Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Individuation' and 'Facts and Propositions'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


10 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
"It is true that x" means no more than x [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: It is evident that "It is true that Caesar was murdered" means no more than that Caesar was murdered.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Facts and Propositions [1927])
     A reaction: At the very least, saying it is true adds emphasis. One sentence is about Caesar, the other about a proposal concerning Caesar, so they can't quite be the same. Note Frege's priority in making this suggestion.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe]
     Full Idea: We cannot assume that every meaningful predicate necessarily expresses a property that some entity could possess. The predicate 'is non-self-exemplifying' is meaningful, yet it would be contradictory for there to be any such property.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Individuation [2003])
     A reaction: This clinches what I would take to be a foregone conclusion - that you can't know what the world contains just by examining the predicates of the English language. However, I suppose predicates are needed to know properties.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe]
     Full Idea: A sphere's matter could not be what makes it one sphere, since matter lacks intrinsic unity, ..and the form cannot make it that very sphere, since an identical sphere may exemplify that universal. So it is a combination of form and matter.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Individuation [2003], 5)
     A reaction: But how do two aspects of the sphere, neither of which has the power to individuate, achieve individuation when they are combined? Like parents, I suppose. Two totally identical spheres can only be individuated by location.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Two distinct entities cannot explain each other, in the same sense of 'explain'. If the height of the flagpole causally explains the length of the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole, though it may predict the latter.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Individuation [2003], 12)
     A reaction: This seems related to the question of the direction of time/causation. Some explanations can be benignly circular, as when a married couple have a passion for chinese food. [S.Bromberger 1966 invented the flagpole case].
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle]
     Full Idea: Freud thinks that our unconscious mental states exist as occurrent intrinsic intentional states even when unconscious. Their ontology is that of the mental, even when they are unconscious.
     From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900]) by John Searle - The Rediscovery of the Mind Ch. 7.V
     A reaction: Searle states this view in order to attack it. Whether such states are labelled as 'mental' seems uninteresting. Whether unconscious states can be intentional is crucial, and modern scientific understanding of the brain strongly suggest they can.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe]
     Full Idea: In no sense is a property a 'constituent' of an object: it is merely a 'facet' or 'aspect' of an object - something which we can talk about or think of separately from that object only by an act of abstraction.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Individuation [2003], 8)
     A reaction: This appears to be in tune with traditional abstractionism, even though Lowe is committed to the reality of universals. To what do I refer when I say 'I like your car, apart from its colour'?
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker]
     Full Idea: Freud persuaded many that beliefs, wishes and feelings are sometimes unconscious, and even sceptics about Freud acknowledge that there is self-deception about motive and attitudes.
     From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900]) by Sydney Shoemaker - Introspection p.396
     A reaction: This seems to me obviously correct. The traditional notion is that the consciousness is the mind, but now it seems obvious that consciousness is only one part of the mind, and maybe even a peripheral (epiphenomenal) part of it.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon]
     Full Idea: Freud argued that the passions in general …were the pressures of a yet unknown 'quantity' (which he simply designated 'Q'). He first thought this flowed through neurones, …and always couched the idea in the language of hydraulics.
     From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900]) by Robert C. Solomon - The Passions 3.4
     A reaction: This is the main target of Solomon's criticism, because its imagery has become so widespread. It leads to talk of suppressing emotions, or sublimating them. However, it is not too different from Nietzsche's 'drives' or 'will to power'.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
Sentence meaning is given by the actions to which it would lead [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: The meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference to the actions to which asserting it would lead.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Facts and Propositions [1927], p.51), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought
     A reaction: I find this idea quite bizarre. Most sentences have no connection to any action or behavior at all. Do we have to ingeniously contrive some possible action? That is the worst sort of behaviourism. See context - Ramsey wasn't stupid!
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch]
     Full Idea: Freud takes a thoroughly pessimistic view of human nature. ...Introspection reveals only the deep tissue of ambivalent motive, and fantasy is a stronger force than reason. Objectivity and unselfishness are not natural to human beings.
     From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900], II) by Iris Murdoch - The Sovereignty of Good II
     A reaction: Interesting. His view seems to have coloured the whole of modern culture, reinforced by the hideous irrationality of the Nazis. Adorno and Horkheimer attacking the Enlightenment was the last step in that process.