12 ideas
23248 | Early empiricists said reason was just a useless concept introduced by philosophers [Galen, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: The so-called Empiricists in Hellenistic times [as cited by Galen] denied the existence of reason, treating it as a useless theoretical postulate introduced by some philosophers | |
From: report of Galen (An Outline of Empiricism [c.170], 87.4-9.28ff) by Michael Frede - Intro to 'Rationality in Greek Thought' p.3 | |
A reaction: I think 'be sensible' is understood by everyone, but 'use your reason' is far from obvious. The main role of reason seems to be as an identifier for human exceptionalism. Animals obviously make good judgements. Frede thinks the empiricists were right. |
14249 | Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley] |
Full Idea: Boolos's conception of plural logic is as a reinterpretation of second-order logic. | |
From: report of George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975]) by Oliver,A/Smiley,T - What are Sets and What are they For? n5 | |
A reaction: Oliver and Smiley don't accept this view, and champion plural reference differently (as, I think, some kind of metalinguistic device?). |
10830 | Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos] |
Full Idea: The metatheory of second-order logic is hopelessly set-theoretic, and the notion of second-order validity possesses many if not all of the epistemic debilities of the notion of set-theoretic truth. | |
From: George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975], p.45) | |
A reaction: Epistemic problems arise when a logic is incomplete, because some of the so-called truths cannot be proved, and hence may be unreachable. This idea indicates Boolos's motivation for developing a theory of plural quantification. |
10829 | A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos] |
Full Idea: One may be of the opinion that no sentence ought to be considered as a truth of logic if, no matter how it is interpreted, it asserts that there are sets of certain sorts. | |
From: George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975], p.44) | |
A reaction: My intuition is that in no way should any proper logic assert the existence of anything at all. Presumably interpretations can assert the existence of numbers or sets, but we should be able to identify something which is 'pure' logic. Natural deduction? |
10832 | '∀x x=x' only means 'everything is identical to itself' if the range of 'everything' is fixed [Boolos] |
Full Idea: One may say that '∀x x=x' means 'everything is identical to itself', but one must realise that one's answer has a determinate sense only if the reference (range) of 'everything' is fixed. | |
From: George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975], p.46) | |
A reaction: This is the problem now discussed in the recent book 'Absolute Generality', of whether one can quantify without specifying a fixed or limited domain. |
10834 | Weak completeness: if it is valid, it is provable. Strong: it is provable from a set of sentences [Boolos] |
Full Idea: A weak completeness theorem shows that a sentence is provable whenever it is valid; a strong theorem, that a sentence is provable from a set of sentences whenever it is a logical consequence of the set. | |
From: George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975], p.52) | |
A reaction: So the weak version says |- φ → |= φ, and the strong versions says Γ |- φ → Γ |= φ. Presumably it is stronger if it can specify the source of the inference. |
13841 | Why should compactness be definitive of logic? [Boolos, by Hacking] |
Full Idea: Boolos asks why on earth compactness, whatever its virtues, should be definitive of logic itself. | |
From: report of George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975]) by Ian Hacking - What is Logic? §13 |
10833 | Many concepts can only be expressed by second-order logic [Boolos] |
Full Idea: The notions of infinity and countability can be characterized by second-order sentences, though not by first-order sentences (as compactness and Skolem-Löwenheim theorems show), .. as well as well-ordering, progression, ancestral and identity. | |
From: George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975], p.48) |
3488 | Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle] |
Full Idea: Freud thinks that our unconscious mental states exist as occurrent intrinsic intentional states even when unconscious. Their ontology is that of the mental, even when they are unconscious. | |
From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900]) by John Searle - The Rediscovery of the Mind Ch. 7.V | |
A reaction: Searle states this view in order to attack it. Whether such states are labelled as 'mental' seems uninteresting. Whether unconscious states can be intentional is crucial, and modern scientific understanding of the brain strongly suggest they can. |
5689 | Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Freud persuaded many that beliefs, wishes and feelings are sometimes unconscious, and even sceptics about Freud acknowledge that there is self-deception about motive and attitudes. | |
From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900]) by Sydney Shoemaker - Introspection p.396 | |
A reaction: This seems to me obviously correct. The traditional notion is that the consciousness is the mind, but now it seems obvious that consciousness is only one part of the mind, and maybe even a peripheral (epiphenomenal) part of it. |
23950 | Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon] |
Full Idea: Freud argued that the passions in general …were the pressures of a yet unknown 'quantity' (which he simply designated 'Q'). He first thought this flowed through neurones, …and always couched the idea in the language of hydraulics. | |
From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900]) by Robert C. Solomon - The Passions 3.4 | |
A reaction: This is the main target of Solomon's criticism, because its imagery has become so widespread. It leads to talk of suppressing emotions, or sublimating them. However, it is not too different from Nietzsche's 'drives' or 'will to power'. |
22344 | Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Freud takes a thoroughly pessimistic view of human nature. ...Introspection reveals only the deep tissue of ambivalent motive, and fantasy is a stronger force than reason. Objectivity and unselfishness are not natural to human beings. | |
From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900], II) by Iris Murdoch - The Sovereignty of Good II | |
A reaction: Interesting. His view seems to have coloured the whole of modern culture, reinforced by the hideous irrationality of the Nazis. Adorno and Horkheimer attacking the Enlightenment was the last step in that process. |