11 ideas
3488 | Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle] |
Full Idea: Freud thinks that our unconscious mental states exist as occurrent intrinsic intentional states even when unconscious. Their ontology is that of the mental, even when they are unconscious. | |
From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900]) by John Searle - The Rediscovery of the Mind Ch. 7.V | |
A reaction: Searle states this view in order to attack it. Whether such states are labelled as 'mental' seems uninteresting. Whether unconscious states can be intentional is crucial, and modern scientific understanding of the brain strongly suggest they can. |
5689 | Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Freud persuaded many that beliefs, wishes and feelings are sometimes unconscious, and even sceptics about Freud acknowledge that there is self-deception about motive and attitudes. | |
From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900]) by Sydney Shoemaker - Introspection p.396 | |
A reaction: This seems to me obviously correct. The traditional notion is that the consciousness is the mind, but now it seems obvious that consciousness is only one part of the mind, and maybe even a peripheral (epiphenomenal) part of it. |
23950 | Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon] |
Full Idea: Freud argued that the passions in general …were the pressures of a yet unknown 'quantity' (which he simply designated 'Q'). He first thought this flowed through neurones, …and always couched the idea in the language of hydraulics. | |
From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900]) by Robert C. Solomon - The Passions 3.4 | |
A reaction: This is the main target of Solomon's criticism, because its imagery has become so widespread. It leads to talk of suppressing emotions, or sublimating them. However, it is not too different from Nietzsche's 'drives' or 'will to power'. |
22344 | Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Freud takes a thoroughly pessimistic view of human nature. ...Introspection reveals only the deep tissue of ambivalent motive, and fantasy is a stronger force than reason. Objectivity and unselfishness are not natural to human beings. | |
From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900], II) by Iris Murdoch - The Sovereignty of Good II | |
A reaction: Interesting. His view seems to have coloured the whole of modern culture, reinforced by the hideous irrationality of the Nazis. Adorno and Horkheimer attacking the Enlightenment was the last step in that process. |
22594 | In 1794 France all individual and legal rights were suppressed by the general will [Dunt] |
Full Idea: In the French Revolution the general will replaced democracy, the separation of powers, the rule of law, and individual rights. | |
From: Ian Dunt (How to be a Liberal [2020], 03) | |
A reaction: I had some sympathy with the idea of the general will, but Dunt has persuaded me otherwise. It is the embodiment of the democratic problem of the tyranny of the majority. |
22602 | Over several centuries a set of eight main liberal values was established [Dunt] |
Full Idea: Over the centuries liberal values were established: freedom of the individual, reason, consent in government, individual rights, the separation of powers, protection of minorities, autonomy, and moderation. | |
From: Ian Dunt (How to be a Liberal [2020], 13) | |
A reaction: What's not to like? 'Moderation' might be a sticking point, for anyone who thinks that very large social changes are needed. |
22596 | No government, or the whole nation, can control an individual beyond legitimate scope [Dunt] |
Full Idea: When a government of any sort puts a threatening hand on that part of individual life beyond its proper scope, …even if it were the whole nation, except for the man it is harassing, it would be no more legitimate for that. | |
From: Ian Dunt (How to be a Liberal [2020]), quoted by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 4 | |
A reaction: The obvious question is what counts as 'proper scope' - and who gets to define it? If the individual can define that, then criminals can appeal to this principle. The state must be persuaded of it, then asked to stick to it during conflicts. |
22603 | Laissez-faire liberalism failed to give people the protections and freedoms needed for a good life [Dunt] |
Full Idea: Laissez-faire liberalism failed, because it did not offer people protections and real freedom - against discrimination, insecure work, educational disadvantage, lack of social respect, absence of representation. It was cold, distant, and ineffective. | |
From: Ian Dunt (How to be a Liberal [2020], 13) | |
A reaction: A very nice summary, which I take to be correct. |
22592 | Nationalism pretends that we can only have a single identity [Dunt] |
Full Idea: Nationalism pretends that there is only one identity, that we cannot be more than one thing at once. | |
From: Ian Dunt (How to be a Liberal [2020], Today) | |
A reaction: Dunt is a defender of liberalism, which assumes a wide degree of pluralism. Could I be a British citizen, but love France more than Britain? I don’t see why not, but it is not an ideal situation. |
4053 | If it is desirable that a given patient die, then moral objections to killing them do not apply [Rachels] |
Full Idea: The cause of death (injection or disease) is important from the legal point of view, but not morally. If euthanasia is desirable in a given case then the patient's death is not an evil, so the usual objections to killing do not apply. | |
From: James Rachels (No Moral Difference [1975], p.102) | |
A reaction: Seems reasonable, but a very consequentialist view. Is it good that small children should clean public toilets? |
4052 | It has become normal to consider passive euthanasia while condemning active euthanasia [Rachels] |
Full Idea: It seems to have become accepted that passive euthanasia (by withholding treatment and allowing a patient to die) may be acceptable, whereas active euthanasia (direct action to kill the patient) is never acceptable. | |
From: James Rachels (No Moral Difference [1975], p.97) | |
A reaction: He goes on to attack the distinction. It is hard to distinguish the two cases, as well as being hard to judge them. |