17 ideas
1922 | Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom [Plato] |
Full Idea: If virtue is a beneficial attribute of spirit, it must be wisdom; for spiritual qualities are not in themselves advantageous, but become so with wisdom…..Hence men cannot be good by nature. | |
From: Plato (Meno [c.385 BCE], 88c) | |
A reaction: Personally I haven't got any 'spiritual qualities', so I don't really understand this. |
11259 | How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? [Plato] |
Full Idea: How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know? | |
From: Plato (Meno [c.385 BCE], 80d05) | |
A reaction: Vasilis Politis cites this as a nice example of the 'aporiai' (puzzles) which Aristotle said were the foundation of enquiry. Nowadays the problem is called the 'paradox of enquiry'. |
20219 | True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons [Plato] |
Full Idea: True opinions are a fine thing and all they do is good, …but they escape from a man's mind, so they are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of the reason why. | |
From: Plato (Meno [c.385 BCE], 98a3) | |
A reaction: This gives justification the role of guarantee, stabilising and securing true beliefs (rather than triggering some new thing called 'knowledge'). |
5985 | Seeking and learning are just recollection [Plato] |
Full Idea: Seeking and learning are in fact nothing but recollection. | |
From: Plato (Meno [c.385 BCE], 81d) | |
A reaction: This is a prelude to the famous conversation with the slave boy about geometry. You don't have to follow Plato into the doctrine of reincarnation; this remark is a key slogan for all rationalists. As pupils in maths lessons, we pull knowledge from within. |
5986 | The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection [Plato] |
Full Idea: The slave boy's knowledge of geometry will not come from teaching but from questioning; he will recover it for himself, and the spontaneous recovery of knowledge that is in him is recollection. | |
From: Plato (Meno [c.385 BCE], 85d) | |
A reaction: Of course, if maths and geometry are huge tautological axiom systems, we would expect to be able to derive them (with hints from a teacher) entirely from their axioms. It is not clear why we might be able to derive the truths of all nature a priori. |
1923 | As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge [Plato] |
Full Idea: True opinion is as good a guide as knowledge for the purpose of acting rightly. | |
From: Plato (Meno [c.385 BCE], 97b) | |
A reaction: This is the germ of Peirce's epistemology - that knowledge is an interesting theoretical concept, but opinion/belief is what matters, and most needs explanation. |
1919 | You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? [Plato] |
Full Idea: You could argue that a man cannot discover what he does know or what he doesn't. The first needs no discovery, and how do you begin looking for the second? | |
From: Plato (Meno [c.385 BCE], 80e) |
3488 | Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle] |
Full Idea: Freud thinks that our unconscious mental states exist as occurrent intrinsic intentional states even when unconscious. Their ontology is that of the mental, even when they are unconscious. | |
From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900]) by John Searle - The Rediscovery of the Mind Ch. 7.V | |
A reaction: Searle states this view in order to attack it. Whether such states are labelled as 'mental' seems uninteresting. Whether unconscious states can be intentional is crucial, and modern scientific understanding of the brain strongly suggest they can. |
5689 | Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Freud persuaded many that beliefs, wishes and feelings are sometimes unconscious, and even sceptics about Freud acknowledge that there is self-deception about motive and attitudes. | |
From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900]) by Sydney Shoemaker - Introspection p.396 | |
A reaction: This seems to me obviously correct. The traditional notion is that the consciousness is the mind, but now it seems obvious that consciousness is only one part of the mind, and maybe even a peripheral (epiphenomenal) part of it. |
23950 | Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon] |
Full Idea: Freud argued that the passions in general …were the pressures of a yet unknown 'quantity' (which he simply designated 'Q'). He first thought this flowed through neurones, …and always couched the idea in the language of hydraulics. | |
From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900]) by Robert C. Solomon - The Passions 3.4 | |
A reaction: This is the main target of Solomon's criticism, because its imagery has become so widespread. It leads to talk of suppressing emotions, or sublimating them. However, it is not too different from Nietzsche's 'drives' or 'will to power'. |
18285 | All translation loses some content (but language does not create reality) [Carnap] |
Full Idea: I do not believe in translatability without loss of content, and therefore I think that the content of a world description is influenced to a certain degree by choice of a language form. But that does not mean that reality is created through language. | |
From: Rudolph Carnap (Letters to Schlick [1935], 1935.12.04), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 19 'Truth' | |
A reaction: It is a mistake to think Quine was the first to spot the interest of translation in philosophy of language. 'Does translation always lose content?' is a very nice question for focusing the problem. |
22344 | Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch] |
Full Idea: Freud takes a thoroughly pessimistic view of human nature. ...Introspection reveals only the deep tissue of ambivalent motive, and fantasy is a stronger force than reason. Objectivity and unselfishness are not natural to human beings. | |
From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900], II) by Iris Murdoch - The Sovereignty of Good II | |
A reaction: Interesting. His view seems to have coloured the whole of modern culture, reinforced by the hideous irrationality of the Nazis. Adorno and Horkheimer attacking the Enlightenment was the last step in that process. |
1913 | Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Is virtue something that can be taught, or does it come by practice, or is it a natural aptitude, or something else? | |
From: Plato (Meno [c.385 BCE], 70a) |
1921 | If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato] |
Full Idea: If virtue is some sort of knowledge, then clearly it could be taught. | |
From: Plato (Meno [c.385 BCE], 87c) |
1927 | It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato] |
Full Idea: If our discussion is right, virtue is acquired neither by nature nor by teaching. Whoever has it gets it by divine dispensation, without taking thought. | |
From: Plato (Meno [c.385 BCE], 99e) |
1916 | Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues [Plato] |
Full Idea: Even if virtues are many and various, at least they all have some common character which makes them all virtues. | |
From: Plato (Meno [c.385 BCE], 72c) |
1918 | How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Does anyone know what a part of virtue is without knowing the whole? | |
From: Plato (Meno [c.385 BCE], 79c) |