11 ideas
22138 | Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter] |
Full Idea: The metaphysical principles that allow the scientist to learn from experience are scholastic, not Humean or Kantian or those of twentieth-century positivism. | |
From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 2) | |
A reaction: Love this. Most modern philosophers of science would be deeply outraged by this, but I reckon that careful and open-minded interviews with scientists would prove it to be correct. We want to know the essential nature of electrons. |
6294 | In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God [John] |
Full Idea: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God. | |
From: St John (04: Gospel of St John [c.95], 01.01) | |
A reaction: 'Word' translates the Greek word 'logos', which has come a long way since Heraclitus. The interesting contrast is with the later Platonist view that the essence of God is the Good. So is the source of everything to be found in reason, or in value? |
8821 | Jesus said he bore witness to the truth. Pilate asked, What is truth? [John] |
Full Idea: Jesus: I came into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Everyone that is of the truth heareth my voice. Pilate saith unto him, What is truth? | |
From: St John (04: Gospel of St John [c.95], 18:37-8) | |
A reaction: There is very little explicit discussion of truth in philosophy before this exchange (apart from Ideas 251 and 586), and there isn't any real debate prior to Russell and the pragmatists. What was Pilate's tone? Did he spit at the end of his question? |
6410 | The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Russell argued that the only 'logically proper' names are those which denote particular entities with which one can be acquainted. The best examples are 'this' and 'that'; other apparent names turn out, when analysed, to be definite descriptions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Acquaintance [1914]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This view is firm countered by the causal theory of reference, proposed by Kripke and others, in which not only people like Aristotle are 'baptised' with a name, but also natural kinds such as water. It is hard to disagree with Kripke on this. |
22134 | Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter] |
Full Idea: Our thoughts are full of generalities, but the world contains no generalities. So how can our thoughts accurately represent the world? This is the problem of universals. | |
From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 1) | |
A reaction: I so love it when someone comes up with a really clear explanation of a problem, and this is a beauty from Stephen Boulter. Only a really clear explanation can motivate philosophical issues for non-philosophers. |
22150 | Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter] |
Full Idea: One can only be sure that a proposition expresses a genuine logical possibility if one can be sure that one's concepts are adequate to things referred to in the proposition. | |
From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 4) | |
A reaction: Boulter says this is a logical constraint place on logical possibility by the scholastics which tends to be neglected by modern thinkers, who only worry about whether the proposition implies a contradiction. So we now use thought experiments. |
22139 | Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter] |
Full Idea: Experiments differ from observational studies in that experiments usually involve intervening in some way in the natural order to see if altering something about that order causes a change in the response of that order. | |
From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 2) | |
A reaction: Not convinced by this. Lots of experiments isolate a natural process, rather than 'intervening'. Chemists constantly purify substances. Particle accelerators pick out things to accelerate. Does 'intervening' in nature even make sense? |
22136 | Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter] |
Full Idea: Three assumptions needed for the emergence of science are central to medieval thought: that the natural order is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, that nature is de-animated, and that it is worthy of study. | |
From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 2) | |
A reaction: A very illuminating and convincing observation. Why did Europe produce major science? The answer is likely to be found in Christianity. |
22135 | Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter] |
Full Idea: While the natural order is richer than our conceptual representations of it, nonetheless our concepts can be adequate to real singulars because simplification is not falsification. | |
From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 1) | |
A reaction: I don't know if 'simplification' is one of the faculties I am trying to identify. I suspect it is a common factor among most of our intellectual faculties. I love 'simplification is not falsification'. Vagueness isn't falsification either. |
22152 | Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter] |
Full Idea: Aristotle and the scholastics accept the analytic/synthetic distinction, but do not take it to be particularly significant. | |
From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 5) | |
A reaction: I record this because I'm an Aristotelian, and need to know what I'm supposed to think. Luckily, I accept the distinction. |
22156 | The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter] |
Full Idea: The objective facts relating to human health broadly construed are the facts that measure the moral value of our actions, policies and institutions. | |
From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 6) | |
A reaction: This is the Aristotelian approach to facts and values, which I thoroughly endorse. To say there is nothing instrinsically wrong with being unhealthy is an absurd attitude. |