Combining Texts

All the ideas for '04: Gospel of St John', 'Two Problems for Essentialism' and 'New system of communication of substances'

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8 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos

6294	In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God [John]
	Full Idea: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God.
	From: St John (04: Gospel of St John [c.95], 01.01)
	A reaction: 'Word' translates the Greek word 'logos', which has come a long way since Heraclitus. The interesting contrast is with the later Platonist view that the essence of God is the Good. So is the source of everything to be found in reason, or in value?

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth

8821	Jesus said he bore witness to the truth. Pilate asked, What is truth? [John]
	Full Idea: Jesus: I came into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Everyone that is of the truth heareth my voice. Pilate saith unto him, What is truth?
	From: St John (04: Gospel of St John [c.95], 18:37-8)
	A reaction: There is very little explicit discussion of truth in philosophy before this exchange (apart from Ideas 251 and 586), and there isn't any real debate prior to Russell and the pragmatists. What was Pilate's tone? Did he spit at the end of his question?

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence

13168	My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: To find real entities I had recourse to a unified formal atom. Hence I rehabilitated the substantial forms in a way to render them intelligible. I found that their nature consists in force, from which follows something analogous to sensation and appetite.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
	A reaction: [several lines are here compressed] This passage sums up the key to Leibniz's essentialism, which I take to be a connection between Aristotelian form and the physicists' notion of force. This gives us a modern version of Aristotelianism for science.

13169	I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Forms establish the true general principles of nature. Aristotle calls them 'first entelechies'; I call them, perhaps more intelligibly, 'primitive forces', which contain not only act or the completion of possibility, but also an original activity.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
	A reaction: As in Idea 13168, I take Leibniz to be unifying Aristotle with modern science, and offering an active view of nature in tune with modern scientific essentialism. Laws arise from primitive force, and are not imposed from without.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples

13170	The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: There are only atoms of substance, that is, real unities absolutely destitute of parts, which are the source of actions, the first absolute principles of the composition of things, and, as it were, the final elements in the analysis of substantial things.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.142)
	A reaction: I like this because it addresses the pure issue of the identity of an individuated object, but also links it with an active view of nature, and not some mere inventory of objects.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance

13171	Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The nature of substance necessarily requires and essentially involves progress or change, without which it would not have the force to act.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.144)
	A reaction: Bravo. Most metaphysical musings regarding 'substance' seem entirely wrapped up in the problem of pure identity, and forget about the role of objects in activity and change.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism

5492	How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects? [Armstrong]
	Full Idea: In Newtonian physics the distance between two objects determines the attractive forces between them, but then the objects will have to be sensitive to the distance, in order to 'know' what forces to generate; but distance isn't a causal power.
	From: David M. Armstrong (Two Problems for Essentialism [2001], p.170)
	A reaction: Ellis replies that he is not troubled, because he believes in essential properties which are separate from their causal roles. Indeed, how else could you explain their causal roles? Still, distance must be mentioned when explaining gravity.

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces

13167	We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Considering 'extended mass' alone was not sufficient to explain the principles of mechanics and the laws of nature, but it is necessary to make use of the notion of 'force', which is very intelligible, despite belonging in the domain of metaphysics.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (New system of communication of substances [1695], p.139)
	A reaction: We may find it surprising that force is a metaphysical concept, but that is worth pondering. It is a mysterious notion within physics. Notice the emphasis on what explains, and what is intelligible. He sees Descartes's system as too passive.