59 ideas
6294 | In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God [John] |
Full Idea: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God. | |
From: St John (04: Gospel of St John [c.95], 01.01) | |
A reaction: 'Word' translates the Greek word 'logos', which has come a long way since Heraclitus. The interesting contrast is with the later Platonist view that the essence of God is the Good. So is the source of everything to be found in reason, or in value? |
8821 | Jesus said he bore witness to the truth. Pilate asked, What is truth? [John] |
Full Idea: Jesus: I came into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Everyone that is of the truth heareth my voice. Pilate saith unto him, What is truth? | |
From: St John (04: Gospel of St John [c.95], 18:37-8) | |
A reaction: There is very little explicit discussion of truth in philosophy before this exchange (apart from Ideas 251 and 586), and there isn't any real debate prior to Russell and the pragmatists. What was Pilate's tone? Did he spit at the end of his question? |
20146 | 'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes] |
Full Idea: 'Luck' is loose shorthand. It stands for various causal chains that intersect and whose intersection we can neither predict nor explain, because we lack the relevant knowledge. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 01.2) | |
A reaction: Aristotle's example is a chance meeting in the market place. The point about 'intersection' seems good, since luck doesn't seem to arise for an event in isolation. |
4363 | The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being? [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: An excellent reason for keeping the word 'person' out of ethics is that it is usually so thinly defined that it cannot generate any sense of 'good person'. If a person is just a self-conscious being, what would count as a good or bad one? | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.9 n20) | |
A reaction: A nice point. Locke's concept of a person (rational self-conscious being) lacks depth and individuality, and Hitler fulfils the criteria as well as any saint. But if Hitler wasn't a 'bad person', what was he bad at being? |
20169 | An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes] |
Full Idea: People can usually be described as intending an action under one description, but not under another. ...Consequently the same action may reasonably be said to be both intentional and unintentional. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 07.2) | |
A reaction: This is the terrorist/freedom fighter problem. The problem seems to arise with long-term intentions, rather than immediate ones. Maybe it is the significance of the intention, rather than the intention itself? |
4355 | There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: There seem to be cases of 'inverse akrasia', in which the course of action actually followed is superior to the course of action recommended by the agent's best judgement. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: This must occur, as when an assassin lets his victim off, and then regrets the deed. It strengthens the case against Socrates, and in favour of their being two parts of the soul which compete to motivate our actions. |
20149 | To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes] |
Full Idea: We increase our control by making our actions more and more the effects of our attitudes, and less and less the effects of external forces acting on us independently of our attitudes. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 02.4) | |
A reaction: He says that the attitudes should be focused on our well-being. Attitudes may also, however, serve some exernal ideal, such as altruism or patriotism. He has built a case for 'control' being a much more important value than 'free will'. |
4325 | Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient? [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: In contemporary philosophy of action, there is a fervid debate about whether any intentional action must be prompted in part by desire, or whether it is possible to be moved to action by a belief alone. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Intro) | |
A reaction: I want a cool belief to be sufficient to produce an action, because it will permit at least a Kantian dimension to ethics, and make judgement central, and marginalise emotivism, which is the spawn of Satan. |
4351 | It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: I personally believe that philosophy is the best route yet devised to the achievement of virtue, but it is clearly not essential. All the philosophers I meet are remarkably virtuous, but that may be a chicken/egg thing. |
4340 | You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Doing what is, say, dishonest solely in the context of a tragic dilemma does not entail being dishonest, possessing that vice. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3 n8) | |
A reaction: This seems right, although it mustn't be thought that the dishonesty is thereby excused. Virtuous people find being dishonest very painful. |
4329 | After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: When one moral requirement has overriden another in a dilemma, there is still a 'remainder', so that regret, or the recognition of some new requirement, are still appropriate. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This is a powerful point on behalf of virtue ethics. There is a correct way to feel about the application of rules and calculations. Judges sleep well at night, but virtuous people may not. |
4330 | Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: With respect to resolvable dilemmas, the deontologist's strategy is to argue that the 'conflict' between the two rules which has generated the dilemma is merely apparent. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This assumes that the rules can't conflict (because they come for God, or pure reason), but we might say that there are correct rules which do conflict. Morality isn't physics, or tennis. |
4341 | Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: The actions a virtuous agent is forced to in tragic dilemmas fail to be good actions because the doing of them, no matter how unwillingly or involuntarily, mars or ruins a good life. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Of course, only virtuous people have their lives ruined by such things. For the cold or the wicked it is just water off a duck's back. |
19738 | Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Our system of values should be understood, among other things, as our attempt to cope with contingencies by making the connection between our well-being and actions less contingent and more within our control. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: He gives an account in which every aspect of morality focuses on human well-being. Of course, the values will dictate what constitutes that well-being, as well as good means of attaining it. |
20145 | Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Values are ...an attempt to cope with contingencies by making the connection between our well-being and actions less contingent and more within our control. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: This sounds more like principles than values, since the former tell you what to do, but a value in itself is just a picture of possibilities. |
20170 | Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Full responsibility is when evil-doers can fully foresee the harm that results, their victims have not provoked it, it violates the requirements of physical protection in a society, the action reflects character, and it is viciously motivated. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 07.4) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The point of this is to omit any reference to an explicit intention to perform an evil act. The Nazi Franz Stangl claimed that he never intended evil, but Kekes says that if true he is innocent, but the above definition makes him guilty. |
20165 | Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes] |
Full Idea: A central assumption of Western moral thought is mistaken: the requirements of reason and morality do not coincide. Immorality need not be unreasonable. ...Malevolent motives in combination with ideologies supply reasons for doing evil. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 06.5) | |
A reaction: I presume that Kant would say the malevolent motives are irrational. If I perform an evil act because someone gives me a stupid reason for doing it, I am not thereby rational because I am acting for a reason. Wrong. |
20171 | Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The assumption that the requirements of reason are universal and impersonal ...is false of practical reason that aims at successful action. Whether a belief is true depends on the facts. Whether an action is successful depends on what success consists in. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 08.5) | |
A reaction: Kekes is trying to eliminate the Kantian idea that reason can lead us to the 'right' thing to do. He rightly points to the complex demands of human, cultural and personal values. |
20175 | If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The absurdity follows [from Kant's categorical imperative] that in the case of moral conflicts reason and morality require us to act irrationally and immorally. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 10.4) | |
A reaction: We can't pick one from two equals if we must have a reason for the preference, but that does not make it 'irrational' to choose one of them, when it doesn't matter which one is chosen. Taking one of the cheese sandwiches is not irrational. |
20174 | Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes] |
Full Idea: We must distinguish between pluralism and relativism about values. Pluralists accept that the validity of cultural and personal values is relative to societies and individuals. But they also hold that human values are objectively valid. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 09.4) | |
A reaction: This is a very attractive response to global moral relativism. I see a problem in the neat division into three distinct forms of value. Each of the three sets of values ought to be sensitive to the other two areas. Humans are cultured individuals. |
20159 | Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes] |
Full Idea: I distinguish four types of cultural values likely to be found in a particular society: interpretations of human values; forms of expression and conduct; institutions and practices within them; and modes of evaluation. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 05.2) | |
A reaction: He proceeds to enlarge on these four. This sub-divides the second of his three main areas of value. I like philosophers who do that sort of thing. It gives you the reassuring feeling that you can break a problem down into elements we understand.... |
20161 | The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The major problem for the human dimension of values is the prevalence of evil; for the cultural dimension it is widespread disenchantment; and for the personal dimension it is pervasive boredom. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 05.5) | |
A reaction: Boldly simple claims, but quite persuasive. Presumably it is the evil in human beings, rather than natural evil (like earthquakes) that is the problem. Disenchantment must come through alienation from social values. Powerlessness, rather than boredom? |
20156 | We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes] |
Full Idea: We inevitably feel regret for the many values we could have, but did not, try to realize. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 04.5) | |
A reaction: He's obviously talking about working harder at our projects. |
20150 | There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes] |
Full Idea: A significant feature of our system of values is that it provides many more values than we could pursue. ...We encounter values as possibilities, and we must accept or reject them. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 03.1) | |
A reaction: This immediately invites the lovely question of what values you are going to invoke when you discriminate among the values available in your culture. Nietzsche says it comes down to 'taste'. |
20158 | Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes] |
Full Idea: There is an irreducible plurality of values that follow from the universal requirements of human well-being, from a shared cultural identity, and from individual conceptions of well-being. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 05 Intro) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a very helpful division. It seems reasonably obvious, but I have not encountered it elsewhere. It is an obvious foundation for international negotiations. We can criticise another culture by appealing to human values. |
20151 | Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The beliefs, emotions, motives, and desires that form our attitudes ...include not only what possibilities we value, but also the limits we should not transgress. ...The strongest limit is what I call 'the unthinkable'. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 03.2) | |
A reaction: Another chance to link to my favourite idea from Democritus! Ideally we want a theory which shows how a vision of the possibilities immediately points to the limits, and to what is unthinkable. |
20152 | Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Unconditional commitments are the most basic convictions we have. They tell us what we must not do no matter what, what we regard as outrageous, horrible, beyond the pale, or, in religious language, as sacrilegious. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 03.3) | |
A reaction: The Aztecs should have made rather different unconditional commitments from the ones they ended up with. How do you persuade someone to make such an unconditional commitment. Abortion seems to involve huge clashes here. |
20153 | Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Doing the unthinkable causes deep, often irreparable, damage to our sense of ourselves. ...That is why the unthinkable indicates a more basic commitment than what we have to any value. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 03.3) | |
A reaction: Kekes makes the interesting claim that what is unthinkable is so basic that it doesn't even count as a value - it is more like a fact of your own nature, which is prior to your values. Not sure about that. |
20162 | Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Four inadequate explanations of human evil attribute it to natural causes, moral monsters, uncharacteristic actions, and corrupting social conditions. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 06.3) | |
A reaction: He is addressing the 'secular problem of evil', which arises if you assume that human beings are essentially good, and then look around you. He says evil explains corrupting social conditions, so we can't be circular about it. |
4358 | Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Some critics say virtue is not necessary for eudaimonia (since the wicked sometimes flourish), and others say it is not sufficient (because virtuous behaviour sometimes ruins a life). | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: Both criticisms seem wrong (the wicked don't 'flourish', and complete virtue never ruins lives, except in tragic dilemmas). But it is hard to prove them wrong. |
4337 | Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Adolescents tend to be much more gormless about consequences than they are about ideals. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2 n12) | |
A reaction: Very accurate, I'm afraid. But this cuts both ways. They seem to need education not in virtue, but simply in consequences. |
4324 | Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: The trouble with 'flourishing' as a translation of 'eudaimonia' is that animals and even plants can flourish, but eudaimonia is possible only for rational beings. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Intro) | |
A reaction: 'Flourishing' still seems better than 'happy', which is centrally used now to refer to a state of mind, not a situation. 'Well being' seems good, and plants are usually permitted that. |
20157 | Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes] |
Full Idea: A reasonable conception of well-being requires mistake-free attitudes and well-ordered commitments to some values selected from our society's system of values. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 05 Intro) | |
A reaction: This summarises where he has got to so far. |
20154 | Control is the key to well-being [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Increasing control is the key to our well-being. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 04 Intro) | |
A reaction: This slogan emerges from a sustained discussion. Hitler and Stalin increased control rather impressively, so we obviously need a bit more than this to get proper well-being. There's also something to be said for going with the flow. |
4359 | When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: If you think about bringing up children to prepare them for life, rather than converting the wicked or convincing the moral sceptic, isn't virtue the most reliable bet? | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: A very convincing idea. They haven't the imagination to grasp consequences properly, or sufficient abstract thought to grasp principles, or the political cunning to negotiate contracts, but they can grasp ideals of what a good person is like. |
4336 | Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Any codification ranking the virtues, like any codification ranking the rules, is bound to come up against cases where we will want to change the rankings. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This seems right, and yet it feels like a slippery slope. Am I supposed to be virtuous and wise, but have no principles? Infinite flexibility can lead straight to wickedness. Even the wise need something to hang on to. |
4334 | Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: One criticism of virtue ethics is that it lamentably fails to come up with a priority ranking of the virtues. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: However, one might refer to man's essential function, or characteristic function, and one might derive the virtues of a good citizen from the nature of a good society. |
4361 | Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: A good social animal is well fitted for 1) individual survival, 2) continuance of its species, 3) characteristic freedom from pain and enjoyment, and 4) good characteristic functioning of its social group. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: This feels right, but brings out the characteristic conservativism of virtue theory. A squirrel which can recite Shakespeare turns out to be immoral. |
4349 | Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Virtue must surely be compatible with a fair amount of inarticulacy about one's reasons for action. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: Virtuous people may be unclear, but we are entitled to hope for clarification from moral philosophers. The least we can hope for is some distinction between virtue and vice. |
4352 | Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful' [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Acting virtuously, in the way the virtuous agent acts, namely from virtue, is sufficient for being 'morally motivated' or acting 'from a sense of duty'. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Fine, but it invites the question of WHY virtue is motivating, just as one can ask this of maximum happiness, or duty, or even satisfaction of selfish desires. |
4353 | If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally? [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: If you are inclined to think that 'moral motivation', acting because you think it is right, must be an all-or-nothing matter, its presence determined by the agent's mind at the moment of acting, do, please, remember children. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: I agree about the vital importance of remembering children when discussing morality. However, Kantians might legitimately claim that when a child is simply trained to behave well, it has not yet reached the age of true morality. |
4346 | The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is a critique of Hume, and of utlitarianism. It pushes us either to the concept of duty, or the concept of virtue (independent of right feeling). |
4339 | According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: According to virtue ethics, in a given situation two different agents may do what is right, what gets a tick of approval, despite the fact that each fails to do what the other did. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: You could certainly have great respect for two entirely different decisions about a medical dilemma, if they both showed integrity and good will, even if one had worse consequences than the other. |
4354 | Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: I am prepare to stick my neck out and say that extreme Nazis or racists (say) have poisoned characters to such an extent that none of their character traits could ever count as a virtue. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Hard to justify, but it is hard to respect a mass murderer because they seem to love their dog or the beauty of music or flowers. They can't possibly appreciate the Platonic Form of love or beauty? |
4364 | Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: It may well be that being particularly well endowed with respect to some virtues inevitably involves being not very well endowed in others. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: Maybe, but this sound a bit like an excuse. Newton wasn't very nice, but Einstein was. I can't believe in a finite reservoir of virtue. |
4356 | We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: That we have some intuitive belief in the unity of the virtues is shown by our reaction to stories of a person who has shown an exceptional virtue, but also done something morally repellent. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: A nice observation, but not enough to establish the unity of virtue. People tend to love all virtue, but it is not obviously impossible to love selected virtues and despise others (e.g. love courage, and despise charity). |
4327 | Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Though it is sometimes said that deontologists 'take no account of consequences', this is manifestly false, for many actions we deliberate about only fall under rules or principles when we bring in their predicted consequences. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: An important defence of deontology, which otherwise is vulnerable to the 'well-meaning fool' problem. It is no good having a good will, but refusing to think about consequences. |
4335 | 'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: If morality is strongly 'codifiable', it should consist of rules which provide a decision procedure, and it should be equally applicable by the virtuous and the non-virtuous, without recourse to wisdom. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: A key idea. Religions want obedience, and Kant wants morality to be impersonal, and most people want morality which simple uneducated people can follow. And yet how can wisdom ever be irrelevant? |
4328 | Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: There are some forms of utilitarianism which aim to be entirely 'value-free' or empirical, such as those which define happiness in terms of the satisfaction of actual desires or preferences, regardless of their content. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This point makes it clear that preference utilitarianism is a doomed enterprise. For a start I can prefer not to be a utilitarian. You can only maximise something if you value if. Are preferences valuable? |
4343 | We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Utilitarianism says there is nothing intrinsically wrong with lying, but examples of bare-faced lying to increase happiness drive us to deontology; but then examples where telling the truth has appalling consequences drive us back to utilitarianism again. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration of why virtue theory suddenly seemed appealing. Deontology can cope, though, by seeing other duties when the consequences are dreadful. |
4338 | Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Deontologists characteristically maintain that utilitarians have made out a particular hard case to be too simple. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Utilitarianism certainly seems to ignore the anguish of hard dilemmas, but that is supposed to be its appeal. If you think for too long, every dilemma begins to seem hopeless. |
20172 | Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The threat of boredom is the dissolution of the evaluative dimension of our life. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 09.1) | |
A reaction: This seems right. If nothing is interesting, then there is no scale of values left, except perhaps 'of possible interest to other people'. |
20173 | Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Boredom combines apathy and restlessness. ...We crave stimulation, worthwhile activities, and objects that engage our interest. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 09.1) |
4365 | We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: Our characteristic way of going on, which distinguishes us from all the other species of animals, is a rational way, which is any way we can rightly see as good, as something we have reason to do. | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch10) | |
A reaction: Some people more than others, and none of us all the time. Romantics see rationality as a restraint on the authentic emotional and animal life. 'Be a good animal'. However, I agree. |
20155 | Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes] |
Full Idea: We feel estranged from our society if the values we prize are not available, and if we do not want to live by the available values. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 04.4) | |
A reaction: There are two pictures here, for a monolithic culture, and for pluralism. For example, the values of Islam are fairly available in the Christian/atheist UK - but not sharia law. Pluralism can embrace a huge array of moderate values, but not extremes? |
20164 | The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The ideal in an ideology may be set down in a sacred text, exemplified in an exceptional life, dictated by laws of history, sociology, or psychology, located in a past uncorrupted idyllic past, or in a future Utopia of perfected human nature, and so on. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 06.4) | |
A reaction: A bit grumpy, but a fair observation about an awful lot of slightly mad social endeavours. |
20163 | Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Ideologies have a set of beliefs about the world, an ideal of life, an explanation of the gap between the ideal and actuality, and a program for closing the gap. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 06.4) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Kekes emerges as a bit right of centre in his politics. He clearly despises such ideologies, yet his book is an optimistic program for correcting things. Maybe the enemy is dogmatic ideologies. Kekes gives an undogmatic account of values. |
20148 | Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes] |
Full Idea: It is useless to distribute insufficient resources equally, because the equal distribution of insufficient resources may result in the even worse outcome that no one's reasonable expectations are met. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 01.5) | |
A reaction: He gives a shortage of oxygen tanks as a persuasive example, but that is hardly typical of the sorts of things that we normally want to distribute. |
4350 | If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith? [Hursthouse] |
Full Idea: If people perform virtuous actions simply because they are commanded by God, would they cease to perform such actions if they lost their faith in God? | |
From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: To be consistent, the answer might be 'yes', but that invites the response that only intrinsically evil people need to be Christians. The rest of us can be good without it. |