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6855
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Interesting philosophers hardly every give you explicitly valid arguments [Martin,M]
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Full Idea:
Notice that very few philosophers - certainly almost none of the ones who are interesting to read - give you explicitly valid arguments.
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From:
Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.134)
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A reaction:
I never thought that was going to happen in philosophy. What I do get is, firstly, lots of interesting reasons for holding beliefs, and a conviction that good beliefs need good reasons, and, secondly, a really coherent view of the world.
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6856
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Valid arguments can be rejected by challenging the premises or presuppositions [Martin,M]
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Full Idea:
Putting forward a valid argument isn't necessarily going to succeed in getting someone to see things your way, because if they don't accept the conclusion, they ask which premises they should reject, or whether an illegitimate assumption is being made.
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From:
Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.136)
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A reaction:
Valid arguments are still vital. It is just that good philosophers realise the problem noted here, and spend huge stretches of discussion on establishing acceptance of premises, and showing that there are no dodgy presuppositions.
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20034
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Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
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Full Idea:
Bratman's three main norms of intention are 'internal consistency' (between a person's intentions), 'means-end coherence' (the means must fit the end), and 'consistency with the agent's beliefs' (especially intending to do and believing you won't do).
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From:
report of Michael Bratman (Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [1987]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 4
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A reaction:
These are controversial, but have set the agenda for modern non-reductive discussions of intention.
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20033
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Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
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Full Idea:
Intentions involve normative commitments. We settle on intended courses, if there is no reason to reconsider them, and intentions put pressure on us to form further intentions in order to more efficiently coordinate our actions.
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From:
report of Michael Bratman (Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [1987]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 4
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A reaction:
[a compression of their summary] This distinguishes them from beliefs and desires, which contain no such normative requirements, even though they may point that way.
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20026
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Intention is either the aim of an action, or a long-term constraint on what we can do [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
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Full Idea:
We need to distinguish intention as an aim or goal of actions, and intentions as a distinctive state of commitment to future action, a state that results from and subsequently constrains our practical endeavours as planning agents.
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From:
report of Michael Bratman (Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [1987]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 2
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A reaction:
I'm not sure how distinct these are, given the obvious possibility of intermediate stages, and the embracing of any available short-cut. If I could mow my lawn with one blink, I'd do it.
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20032
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Bratman rejected reducing intentions to belief-desire, because they motivate, and have their own standards [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
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Full Idea:
Bratman motivated the idea that intentions are psychologically real and not reducible to desire-belief complexes by observing that they are motivationally distinctive, and subject to their own unique standards of rational appraisal.
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From:
report of Michael Bratman (Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [1987]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 4
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A reaction:
If I thought my belief was a bit warped, and my desire morally corrupt, my higher self might refuse to form an intention. If so, then Bratman is onto something. But maybe my higher self has its own beliefs and desires.
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