Combining Texts

All the ideas for '04: Gospel of St John', 'Languages of Art (2nd edn)' and 'The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics'

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10 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God [John]
     Full Idea: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God.
     From: St John (04: Gospel of St John [c.95], 01.01)
     A reaction: 'Word' translates the Greek word 'logos', which has come a long way since Heraclitus. The interesting contrast is with the later Platonist view that the essence of God is the Good. So is the source of everything to be found in reason, or in value?
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Jesus said he bore witness to the truth. Pilate asked, What is truth? [John]
     Full Idea: Jesus: I came into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Everyone that is of the truth heareth my voice. Pilate saith unto him, What is truth?
     From: St John (04: Gospel of St John [c.95], 18:37-8)
     A reaction: There is very little explicit discussion of truth in philosophy before this exchange (apart from Ideas 251 and 586), and there isn't any real debate prior to Russell and the pragmatists. What was Pilate's tone? Did he spit at the end of his question?
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The Barcan Formulas express how to combine modal operators with classical quantifiers [Simchen]
     Full Idea: The Barcan Formula and its converse gives expression to the most straightforward way of combining modal operators with classical quantification.
     From: Ori Simchen (The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics [2013], §1)
The Barcan Formulas are orthodox, but clash with the attractive Actualist view [Simchen]
     Full Idea: The Barcan Formulas are a threat to 'actualism' in modal metaphysics, which seems regrettable since the Formulas are validated by standard modal logics, but clash with the plausible and attractive actualist view (that there are no merely possible things).
     From: Ori Simchen (The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics [2013], §1)
     A reaction: He notes that the Barcan Formulas 'appear to require quantification over possibilia'. So are you prepared to accept the 'possible elephant in your kitchen'? Conceptually yes, but actually no, I would have thought. So possibilia are conceptual.
BF implies that if W possibly had a child, then something is possibly W's child [Simchen]
     Full Idea: In accordance with the Barcan Formula we assume that if it is possible that Wittgenstein should have had a child, then something or other is possibly Wittgentein's child.
     From: Ori Simchen (The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics [2013], §5)
     A reaction: Put like this it sounds unpersuasive. What is the something or other? Someone else's child? A dustbin? A bare particular? Wittgenstein's child? If it was the last one, how could it be Wittgenstein's child while only possibly being that thing?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen]
     Full Idea: Serious Actualism is the view that in possible circumstances in which something does not exist there are no facts about it of any kind, including its very non-existence
     From: Ori Simchen (The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics [2013], §1 n4)
     A reaction: He suggests that the Converse Barcan Formula implies this view. It sounds comparable to the view of Presentism about time, that no future or past truthmakers exist right now. If a new square table were to exist, it would have four corners.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
Art is a referential activity, hence indefinable, but it has a set of symptoms [Goodman]
     Full Idea: No definition of art is possible (since it is a referential activity), …but the symptoms of art are syntactic density, semantic density, syntactic repleteness, exemplificationality, and multiple and complex reference.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968], p.22-255), quoted by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics) 4
     A reaction: I wish these labels were more self-explanatory. Goodman seems to want to assimilate art to his earlier interests in linguistic anti-realism and mereology. I wouldn't have thought he now had many followers.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 5. Art as Language
Artistic symbols are judged by the fruitfulness of their classifications [Goodman, by Giovannelli]
     Full Idea: Artistic symbols are to be judged for the classifications they bring about, for how novel and insightful those classifications are, for how they change our world perceptions and relations.
     From: report of Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968]) by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics) 4
     A reaction: This seems to be an awfully long way from our normal experience of art. I understand 'symbols' in early Flemish art, but not in Mondriaan, or even Rembrandt.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art
A performance is only an instance of a work if there is not a single error [Goodman]
     Full Idea: The most miserable performance without actual mistakes does count as an instance of a work, …but the most brilliant performance with a single wrong note does not.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968], p.186), quoted by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics)
     A reaction: Mereological essentialism applied to art! You need to be a highly theoretical and technical philosopher (which Goodman was) to maintain such a weird and contrary-usage proposal.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 2. Copies of Art
A copy only becomes an 'instance' of an artwork if there is a system of notation [Goodman]
     Full Idea: Paintings and sculptures do not work within a notation; hence, there is no copying of an original that would preserve its originality. A copy of a painting is a copy, not an instance of the original.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968], p.212), quoted by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics) 2
     A reaction: Sounds conclusive, but isn't. Is a poetry manuscript a 'notation' or an original? Why is an etching plate a notation, but painting on canvas is an original? Can I create a painting specifically so that it can be copied (by my students)? Intention matters.