Combining Texts

All the ideas for '04: Gospel of St John', '12: Colossians' and 'Perceptual experience has conceptual content'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy [Paul]
     Full Idea: Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy.
     From: St Paul (12: Colossians [c.55], 2.8)
     A reaction: The same might be said of preaching. The two sorts of spoiling seem to be fanaticism and wickedness. While reason can lead to fanaticism, I believe (with Socrates) that it is unlikely to corrupt morally.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God [John]
     Full Idea: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God.
     From: St John (04: Gospel of St John [c.95], 01.01)
     A reaction: 'Word' translates the Greek word 'logos', which has come a long way since Heraclitus. The interesting contrast is with the later Platonist view that the essence of God is the Good. So is the source of everything to be found in reason, or in value?
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Jesus said he bore witness to the truth. Pilate asked, What is truth? [John]
     Full Idea: Jesus: I came into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Everyone that is of the truth heareth my voice. Pilate saith unto him, What is truth?
     From: St John (04: Gospel of St John [c.95], 18:37-8)
     A reaction: There is very little explicit discussion of truth in philosophy before this exchange (apart from Ideas 251 and 586), and there isn't any real debate prior to Russell and the pragmatists. What was Pilate's tone? Did he spit at the end of his question?
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements [Brewer,B]
     Full Idea: Given that sense experiential states do provide reasons for empirical beliefs, they must have conceptual content, ...where a mental state with conceptual content is one where the content is of a possible judgement by the subject.
     From: Bill Brewer (Perceptual experience has conceptual content [2005], I)
     A reaction: This is, I believe, wrong. Even complex observations, like a pool of blood, only become reasons when they have been interpreted. Otherwise they are just the raw ingredients of evidence. How could an uninterpreted red patch be a 'reason'?